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Abstract 
 
The mystical nature of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poems, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, 
“Christabel” and “Kubla Khan” has intrigued readers for over two centuries. Of these full poems only 
the “Rime” is complete and yet they all still enjoy the scrutiny of a wide audience. This thesis 
examines the circumstances surrounding Coleridge’s inability to continue writing such poems of 
imaginative force. In the years immediately following the composition of these great imaginative 
poems, Coleridge identified himself as lost in “the unwholesome quicksilver mines of mataphysic”, 
and in “Dejection: An Ode” confessed that he lost his “shaping spirit of Imagination” through 
“abstruse research” (PW I ii 700, ll. 86,89). John Lowes refers to this loss as Coleridge’s loss of power 
(Lowes, 1951, 476n). This thesis ascertains the factors, both primary and secondary, that contributed 
to Coleridge’s loss of imaginative force, and it also identifies factors that enhanced his imagination. 
Increasingly Coleridge made reasoned engagements with the metaphysics of German Idealism. This 
essentially rendered his poetic access redundant as well as occluding empirical engagement. My 
primary argument is that Coleridge lost his imaginative force as a result of shifting his interest from a 
mostly empirical philosophy, to one based in German Idealism of the Kantian inheritance. Coleridge’s 
loss of imaginative force correlates with his residence in Germany from 1798-99, when he studied at 
the University of Göttingen. Thus the predominant focus of this thesis is on Coleridge’s early career. 
The reason for this choice of subject is that Coleridge himself considered his loss of imaginative force 
to be significant, and regarded these poems as exemplary examples of a poetics of imagination that he 
could not regain. 
In elucidating Coleridge’s loss of imaginative force the methodology of this thesis will move 
between the secondary sources of other critics and the copious biographical information on Coleridge. 
It will also include my own analysis of the poems, and alongside these, gently suggest my own 
theories of imagination. 
Coleridge’s imagination poems predominantly define the self and his ideas on the will. Coleridge 
wrote on a variety of subjects relating to philosophy, sociology, politics, epistemology and religion, 
and in these he includes his intrigue with the faculty of the will. The will is also central to the different 
philosophies that Coleridge studied before, during and after he wrote his imagination poems. As such, 
Coleridge’s treatment of the will must be closely examined in its role as a participating factor in his 
imagination poetry. Such an examination must include scrutiny of necessitarianism and Calvinism 
because these doctrines involve the will in their theories of predetermination and causation. 
Coleridge’s ideas on the imagination are closely associated with the will, and in his theories on these 
topics he considered the secondary imagination to echo the primary imagination, and to co-exist with 
the conscious will (BL I 304). 
Factors affecting Coleridge between 1795 and 1801 are important to this thesis as they influence 
the development and loss of his imagination poetry, mostly written between 1797 and 1798. Such 
factors include his marriage to Sara Fricker, abandonment of pantisocracy, friendship with William 
Wordsworth, the shift from radical politics towards conservatism, deprecating criticism of his 
imagination poetry from Wordsworth and Southey among others, opium use, and meeting Sara 
Hutchinson. 
These poems shall finally be examined in the context of their classification as Romantic poems that 
define the individual and the self in solitude. As much as Coleridge’s great poems of the imagination 
are located in his struggle for a comprehensive account of the self and the will, working towards a 
Romantic statement of the individual, and the self in solitude, they also need to be defined as 
characteristically irreducible, unfathomable and mystical. 
The conclusion of this thesis maintains its introductory assertion that the primary cause of 
Coleridge’s loss of imagination was the result of his research in German Idealism. In particular, his 
metaphysical speculations diverted him from empirical philosophy and weakened his imaginative 
force, and are primarily responsible for his loss of imaginative force. The conclusion asserts 
Coleridge’s accomplishment with the imagination poems, but also acknowledges his achievement in 
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 1 
Introduction 
The unwholesome quicksilver mines of metaphysic: Introductory 
In 1801, Coleridge claimed that poetry had died in him. He stated with regret, “I was 
once a Volume of Gold Leaf, rising & riding on every breath of Fancy––but I have 
beaten myself back into weight & density, and now I sink in quicksilver, yea, remain 
squat and square on the earth” (25 March 1801, CL II 714). 
Between 1797 and 1798, Coleridge wrote his most significant poems of the 
imagination, whilst resident at Nether Stowey. This span of creativity was not only 
surprisingly brief, but he wrote these poems early in his career, and his ability to write 
such poetry was lost suddenly thereafter. Throughout his life he exercised great 
efforts in attempting to explain his lost imaginative ability even while he struggled to 
regain it. This dissertation examines Coleridge’s lo s of imagination, and elucidates 
several factors that contributed to the imagination p ems1 but primarily it expounds 
the factors that caused the loss of his imagination. The reason for this choice of 
subject is that Coleridge himself considered his los f imaginative force to be 
significant, and regarded these poems as examples of a p etics of imagination that he 
could not regain. In all of this the problem offers a new angle of light on to so deeply 
Romantic and specifically Coleridgean concepts of the imaginative self.  
With such a focus, there is the danger of marginalising Coleridge’s genius and 
vision, and his vast range of ability. The imagination poems comprise a small fraction 
of his wide range of interests, ability and literary output. In this regard, it is important 
to establish at this early stage, that his loss of imagination is not a failing of 
Coleridge’s, but is the result of him applying his attention to other fields, that 
subordinated his poetry of imagination. Accordingly, this dissertation deals with the 
                                                      
1 The term “imagination poem” is selected for this dsertation as it is related to the already settled 
concept of the conversation poems. By it I mean those poems of deliberate yet visionary peculiarity. 
These poems are “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, “Christabel” and Kubla Khan”. These three great 
poems, play into the conversation poems, and make Col ridge’s most profound contribution to the 
composition of English Romantic poetry; they are co-incident with the project of the epochal Lyrical 
Ballads, and immediately predate the sudden diminution of his poetic force and output. Although the 
upper case is a directly appropriate orthography for the “Conversation Poems”, what I am calling the 
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short-lived generation of the poems of imagination, and with the shifts and changes in 
Coleridge’s life that are contemporary to these poems and that influence them. 
Coleridge strongly regretted losing his imaginative force and commented on this in 
several of his texts. Although his imagination was not “burned in a day”, the period 
was brief between his last demonstrated ability to write poetry of imaginative force, 
and his claims to have lost that ability. Coleridge’s inaccuracy about dates, and his 
conflicting recollections about the writing of these poems, do not always allow for 
exact references to times of writing. Nevertheless Coleridge’s last poems of 
imagination he wrote in 1798, which was the year after beginning the first, perhaps 
the “Rime”, begun in November 1797, while walking with Wordsworth to Lynton 
(PW I i lxvi). However, he did claim to have written “Kubla Khan” “in the fall of the 
year 1797” (Ibid. n511), “the summer of the year 1797” (511), and in May 1798 (CN 
III 4006 f 23r). Nevertheless, the time span taken by Coleridge to write these poems 
was brief, and he realised his inability to continue writing poems of this type shortly 
thereafter. 
Coleridge commented on his loss of imaginative force, when in 1816 he 
complained that he was lost in “the unwholesome quicksilver mines of mataphysic 
depths.” (BL I 17). The repeated images of quicksilver characteise Coleridge’s grasp 
on imagination. Mercury is a substance that one cannot hold or manipulate into a 
permanent and definitive form. Together with silver, this metal is the substance 
assumed, in the age of alchemy, to most likely be turned into gold. Coleridge’s own 
efforts to solidify his imaginative ability from its elusive indefinable shape are 
equivalent to this, but he never re-grasped his imag native force once it was lost. In 
this respect he never solidified his imaginative ability into an established method, or 
firmly held it as a workable poetic, and hence failed to render it as gold. 
“[T]he unwholesome quicksilver mines of mataphysic” refers to the philosophy 
that captured Coleridge’s fascination after 1799, following his visit to Germany. 
Herein he steadily gravitated towards the philosophy of German Idealism, dominated 
by the influence of the strict analytical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. At the time of 
Coleridge’s German residence Johann Fichte propounded and formalised German 
                                                                                                                                                       
imagination poems have not yet won this convention for themselves. In these terms I therefore use 
lower case for both. 
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Idealism. Fichte attempted to remove the conflicting elements of Kant’s system, by 
removing the “thing-in-itself” as the element of exp rience, and instead regard 
experience as produced by the thinking subject (Kenny, 1999, 274). 
Coleridge’s philosophical interests prior to Germany were mostly empirical, and in 
this his primary influences were the doctrines of Hartley and Berkeley, who were 
empiricists. Unlike the rationalistic focus of German Idealism, Hartley and Berkeley 
were part of the broad empirical tradition from Bacon through to Hume, who believed 
that knowledge originated with experience. Once Coleridge began studying German 
Idealism, his philosophy became progressively less focussed on empiricism. 
Coleridge committed his primary philosophical attenio  to German Idealism after 
1799, but his fascination with certain empiricists continued after this year, as in the 
case of Berkeley, whereas he became increasingly ambiv lent toward Hartley. The 
metaphysics to which Coleridge alludes in his famous quote is the analytical 
philosophy of German Idealism, and with it Coleridge ained an increasing affinity 
with the works of Kant. Coleridge does however exprss his eagerness to study 
metaphysics prior to 1799. He writes about it in a letter to John Thelwall on 19 
November 1796, 
 
I am, & ever have been, a great reader––& have read almost 
everything––a library-cormorant––I am deep in all out f the way 
books, whether of the monkish times, or of the puritanical era––I have 
read & digested most of the Historical Writers––; but I do not like 
History. Metaphysics and Poetry and ‘Facts of mind,’ (i.e. Accounts 
of all the strange phantasms that ever possessed your philosophy-
dreamers from Tauth [Toth], the Egyptian to Taylor, the English 
Pagan,) are my darling studies. 
(CL I 260) 
 
He made this statement approving of metaphysics before he was immersed in German 
Idealism, and Coleridge’s knowledge of metaphysics wa  limited when he studied it 
at this time, in which he gave empiricism his primary ttention. Empiricism, by its 
nature, cannot contain metaphysics, but Coleridge’s captivation with metaphysics 
prior to 1799, indicates a dual interest in metaphysics and empiricism, albeit one 
primarily focussed on empiricism. What he responds to in Kant is the Kantian 
determination to acknowledge philosophies based both on reason and empiricism. 
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Coleridge was strongly aware that his research into metaphysics was primarily 
responsible for his inability to write poems of “pure imagination”. As a result 
Coleridge placed the blame for the loss of his imagin tive faculty on himself, 
claiming this in “Dejection: An Ode”, written in 1802,  
 
There was a time when, though my path was rough, 
    This joy within me dallied with distress, 
And all misfortunes were but as the stuff 
    Whence Fancy made me dreams of happiness: 
For hope grew round me, like the twining vine, 
And fruits, and foliage, not my own, seemed mine. 
But now afflictions bow me down to earth: 
Nor care I that they rob me of my mirth; 
       But oh! each visitation 
Suspends what nature gave me at my birth, 
    My shaping spirit of Imagination. 
For not to think of what I needs must feel, 
    But to be still and patient, all I can; 
And haply by abstruse research to steal 
    From my own nature all the natural Man-- 
    This was my sole resource, my only plan: 
Till that which suits a part infects the whole, 
And now is almost grown the habit of my Soul. 
(PW I ii 700, ll. 76-93) 
 
The “shaping spirit of imagination” destroyed by “abstruse research” asserts that his 
metaphysical research is responsible, and his claim made years later that he was “lost 
in the quicksilver mines of metaphysic” repeats thi. Here Coleridge admits his loss of 
imaginative force, and again he recognises the cause. This reference also indicates 
that he dwelt on his loss of imagination and was concerned to regain it. In this quote 
from “Dejection: An Ode” Coleridge implies the delicacy of “pure imagination”. He 
reiterates this delicacy and the effect that metaphysics had on his imaginative force in 
the Biographia, and refers to the time-span during which he was able to write such 
poetry: 
 
Well were it for me perhaps, had I never relapsed into the same mental 
disease; if I had continued to pluck the flower and reap the harvest 
from the cultivated surface, instead of delving in the unwholesome 
quicksilver mines of metaphysic depths. And if in after time I have 
sought a refuge from bodily pain and mismanaged sensibility in 
abstruse researches, which exercised the strength ad subtlety of the 
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understanding without awakening the feelings of the heart; still there 
was a long and blessed interval, during which my natural faculties 
were allowed to expand, and my original tendencies to develop 
themselves: my fancy, and the love of nature, and the sense of beauty 
in forms and sounds. 
(BL I 17) 
 
Here Coleridge refers to the fragility of the imagination that he lost in metaphysical 
study. He repeats this later in the Biographia, and incorporates the imagination’s 
fragility with its illusive tendencies. He refers to the imagination as a “synthetic and 
magical power” “put in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their 
irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed, controul (sic)” (BL II 16). The will and 
understanding, Coleridge discerns as the functions directly involved in activating and 
controlling the imagination. In this dissertation, the will shall be closely examined in 
its role as a participating factor in Coleridge’s imagination poetry. Coleridge defined 
“imagination” in the Biographia, reasserting the “synthetic and magical power”; 
 
For, even as truth is its own light and evidence, discovering at once 
itself and falsehood, so is it the prerogative of petic genius to 
distinguish by parental instinct its proper offspring from the 
changelings, which the gnomes of vanity or the fairies of fashion may 
have laid in its cradle or called by its names. Could a rule be given 
from without, poetry would cease to be poetry, and sink into a 
mechanical art. It would be [fashioning], not [creation]. The rules of 
the IMAGINATION are themselves the very powers of growth and 
production. The words to which they are reducible, present only the 
outlines and external appearance of the fruit. A deceptive counterfeit 
of the superficial form and colours may be elaborated; but the marble 
peach feels cold and heavy, and children only put it to their mouths. 
(BL II 84) 
 
Coleridge explains that the “rules of the IMAGINATION” are illusive and misleading 
if stated too plainly. He emphasises that the imagin tion is fragile and illusive, 
because it is difficult to define, and if explained strictly and precisely it becomes a 
counterfeit of what it should be. 
Coleridge’s definition of poetry and the imagination is incorporated in the context 
of the Romantic movement, which introduced new forms of poetry. The 
characteristics of Romantic poetics include the abandonment of most prior forms of 
poetry, and the development of radical new forms. These characteristics include the 
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interaction of the individual mind with nature, introspection, solitude, isolate context, 
consciousness of self and social intention characteristic of the Lake Poets. The 
intention of Coleridge and Wordsworth, in writing and compiling the Lyrical Ballads, 
incorporated many of these characteristics, and the imagination poems are inseparable 
from this context of production, collaboration and experiment. Coleridge and 
Wordsworth each wrote different types of experimental poetry in the Lyrical Ballads. 
Coleridge wrote what he called the “first class” of characteristics decided on by 
Wordsworth and himself: 
 
In the one, the incidents and agents were to be, in part at least, 
supernatural; and the excellence aimed at was to consist in the 
interesting of the affections by the dramatic truth of such emotions, as 
would naturally accompany such situations, supposing them real. And 
real in this sense they have been to every human being who, from 
whatever source of delusion, has at any time believd himself under 
supernatural agency… 
 
In this idea originated the plan of the “Lyrical Ballads;” in which it 
was agreed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and 
characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer from 
our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient 
to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of 
disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic fa th… 
 
With this view I wrote the “Ancient Mariner,” and was preparing 
among other poems, the “Dark Ladie,” and the “Christabel,” in which 
I should have more nearly realized my ideal, than I had done in my 
first attempt. 
(BL II 6-7) 
 
Coleridge recalls his intentions for the Lyrical Ballads here, and considers some of the 
characteristics of his poems for the publication. The transference “from our inward 
nature a human interest”, and “the willing suspensio  of disbelief” claim the 
intentions of the Romantic movement for introspection, consciousness of self and 
social intention. Coleridge’s poems of imagination share characteristics with 
Romantic poetry generally, but they also incorporate f ctors unique to themselves. 
They are poems of imaginative force because they are irreducible, unfathomable, 
transcendent, mystical and contain “synthetic and magical power”. A key element of 
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the poems of imagination is their transcendent characte istic, as in them Coleridge 
develops knowledge beyond his own faculties. 
Five poems bear these characteristics prominently, three of which have drawn a 
significant amount of critical attention. The three are the “Rime”, “Christabel” and 
“Kubla Khan”. The “Rime” predominates as an example of imagination poetry in this 
dissertation. Indeed, it predominates as such through t the entire canon of English 
poetry. “Christabel” shall also be scrutinised. The remaining two imagination poems 
are “Lewti; or, the Circassian Love-chant” and “The Ballad of the Dark Ladiè: A 
Fragment”. Other poems that are not characterised as the poems of heightened 
imagination shall be examined either because of their correlations with the 
imagination poetry, or because of their references to Coleridge’s loss of poetic force. 
Coleridge’s imaginative force, which was essential to write the poems of 
heightened imagination, was lost with the completion of “Christabel” Part II. These 
poems are unique, and with them, Coleridge’s contribution to poetry in general is 
invaluable. John Lowes was captivated by the imaginatio  poems, and by how 
Coleridge wrote them (Lowes, 1951, x). Lowes examines Coleridge’s ability to write 
these poems, and comments on Coleridge’s loss of power to write them. Less 
fundamental are Lowes’s analyses of Coleridge’s metaphysics once Coleridge’s 
imagination was lost (x). Lowes is primarily intrigued with the process through which 
Coleridge generated the poems of imagination. This is an illusive search of Lowes’s 
as the characteristics of the poems are transcendent and unfathomable. Their illusive 
nature is emphasised with Coleridge failing in his own attempts to define and 
recapture his imaginative ability. However Coleridge’s genius demonstrated itself in 
other areas, notably in his writing on a wide range of subjects involving philosophy, 
sociology, politics, epistemology and religion. This notably occurs in the Biographia, 
in which he eagerly incorporates these subjects for analysis and application 
throughout the text. 
The Lyrical Ballads has remained a significant text since its first publication 
despite Coleridge’s attention to these other subjects. Harold Bloom looks at the 
lasting importance of the Lyrical Ballads in general, and reiterates Lowes in asserting 
that the first edition of the Lyrical Ballads “remains the most important volume of 
verse in English since the Renaissance, for it began modern poetry, the poetry of the 
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growing inner self” (Bloom, 2004, 322). The experimental intention of Coleridge and 
Wordsworth, in their representation of inward nature, human interest and feeling for 
everyday life began this form of poetry. It is not just the poems individually but the 
production and collective whole of the Lyrical Ballads that Bloom is praising. 
Coleridge contributed several poems to this volume, including two of the poems of 
imagination, the “Rime” and “Lewti”. The “Rime” has become established as one of 
the most identified poems of the English language. Accordingly Coleridge’s 
contribution to the Lyrical Ballads is among his most significant literary content, even 
though in quantity it is less than Wordsworth’s content in the edition, and is brief 
relative to Coleridge’s complete range of works. However, despite Coleridge’s 
accomplishment in the Lyrical Ballads, these poems do not undermine his other 
works.  
In some of his other texts Coleridge continued developing concepts, such as the 
imagination, that he had used in the Lyrical Ballads. He developed the role of the 
imagination in the Biographia, and defined the imagination with a word of his own 
invention, the “esemplastic power” of the imagination that shapes into one (BL I 168). 
This he separated into primary imagination and secondary imagination; 
 
The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The 
primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all 
human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM. 
(BL I 304) 
 
The primary imagination as Coleridge expressed it principally assists perception, and 
functions “esemplastically” in that it shapes into one. However, the secondary 
imagination does not act in this way, and is not characterised by this definition. Of the 
secondary imagination he details, 
 
The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-
existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in 
the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of 
its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or 
where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it 
struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all 




The activity that “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates” to “re-create” in the struggle of the 
secondary imagination to “idealize and to unify” is reminiscent of the characteristic of 
quicksilver. The secondary imagination struggles to take on a definitive form and 
idealise and unify itself, as does quicksilver. These characteristics are found in 
Coleridge’s poems of imagination and render deep analyses of these poems 
ambiguous. 
All of the references above, spanning twenty years, point out Coleridge’s frequent 
attention to and analysis of the imagination poetry, and his reflections on his loss of 
imaginative force. He not only recognises the cause of this loss, but he attempts to 
revive the ability. These references also indicate Coleridge’s constant and eager 
scrutiny of German Idealist philosophy, despite itsncompatibility with the 
imagination poetry. This incompatibility necessitated that Coleridge choose between 
these two options, hence his regret in “Dejection: A  Ode”, in which he feels the 
effects of metaphysics, “Till that which suits a part infects the whole,//And now is 
almost grown the habit of my Soul” (PW I ii 700, ll. 92-3). 
The circumstances that necessitated this choice began when Coleridge left for 
Ratzenburg in October 1798. On his return to Nether Stowey, in July the following 
year (Sisman, 2006, 253, 269), he had little imagintive ability remaining. 
Exceptionally, “Christabel” Part II, completed in 1800-1, is Coleridge’s only work of 
imagination that post-dates his stay in Germany, and is remarkably divided by this 
visit. Alluringly a third section was written thereafter, but went unpublished and was 
lost, “a part of the third book” Coleridge recalled in a letter to Byron (22 October 
1815, Griggs, 1930, 1091). This letter is absent from Griggs’s Collected Letters of 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, but Griggs quotes it in full in his article “Coleridge and 
Byron”, published in 1930. A marked decline in Coleridge’s poetic output only occurs 
after 1800. This decline has more to do with his preoccupation with alternative 
philosophical subjects than the mere poetic disillusionment found in “Dejection: An 
Ode”, a poem which not only describes his loss of imagination, but also bears signs of 
an attempt to regain it.  
The general circumstances of the late 1790s, when Coleridge wrote the poems of 
imagination, did not contribute to Coleridge’s disillusionment and loss of poetic force. 
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At this time there were political and military upheavals across Britain and Europe. 
The French Revolution had begun a decade earlier, and was ongoing throughout the 
1790s (Fairer, 2009, 285-290). It had initiated political and social radicalism that had 
filtered into Britain, and was adopted by political protagonists. This radicalism 
became one of the wells on which Romanticism drew. New identities of statehood 
provoked new identities about self and individualism, and within these societies, the 
industrial revolution developed. The idea of sovereignty pertaining to the individual 
and to the nation as a whole was developing. Society and values rapidly shifted as 
new political and socio-economic circumstances rooted themselves in Europe. With a 
society and nation in a state of change philosophical and social reformers such as 
William Godwin emerged and flourished. 
These changing circumstances developed new theories and ideologies of society, 
learning and politics, as found in examples such as pantisocracy, in which Coleridge 
was involved. Works by theorists such as Godwin explored these aspects of society 
and influenced Coleridge (Sisman, 66). Pantisocracy provided a distinct relationship 
between the self and the other that was not dependent on materialism. In this respect 
the non-materialist position of pantisocracy drew on n n-materialist philosophy for its 
bearing, opposing the doctrine that only matter exists. Therefore, the role of 
philosophy, sociology, politics, epistemology and religion, in the making of the self, 
became a topic of greater scrutiny and contention. These circumstances induced 
thought on the perception of self, and these perspectives of selfhood occur in 
Coleridge’s writings of the 1790s, including the Lyrical Ballads. 
The time in which the poems of heightened imagination were written necessitates 
attention to the context of unprecedented upheaval in the 1790s. Discussing his 
“organic sense of history”, David Fairer elucidates hat in the 1790s, during the 
political reform in France, “more subtle and challenging ideas about the self and the 
world” emerged in Europe (Fairer, 60).  
Also enlivening and impacting on the 1790s and Coleridg ’s imagination poetry 
are the market forces affecting publishing at this ime. Factors influencing the market 
included war and revolution in Europe, which caused an array of different political 
and social perspectives to emerge, and with these, new perceptions of the self and 
citizenship. The industrial revolution enhanced economics and expenditure, and with 
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industrialisation and its associated technologies aro e new occasions for commodity 
related materialism based on economics. This type of materialism is different to the 
philosophical materialism above, and deals with increased wealth and new economic 
opportunities, and the ability of the individual to interact in the changing economic 
space. In this context, the Lyrical Ballads also contained the newness of the age, as it 
was experimental poetry, written partly to clarify the reaction of the readership to a 
new type of poetry. These poems were compiled and published in this context. 
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Chapter 1 
Reliques of sensation: psychological interpretations of the unconscious in the 
imagination poems 
Throughout the twentieth century, Coleridge’s imagin tion poems have undergone a 
fascinating variety of interpretations. These poems have attracted such interpretations 
due, in part, to their inexplicable and transcendent nature. However, in this they have 
a mercurial attribute and cannot sustain a constant explanation. Some interpretations 
attempt to explain how Coleridge wrote these poems, and they also attempt to infer, 
using their own findings, how Coleridge lost his poetic force. 
Topics that interested Coleridge, and that are used in the interpretation of the 
imagination poetry, are the conscious and the unconsci us. Coleridge’s attraction to 
the conscious mind included attention to the personal will and volition. This interest 
extended to its opposite, the unconscious, which led him to journalise his dreams. 
Coleridge recalled his father’s dream on the night that his father died, of Death 
touching him with his dart (16 October 1797, CL I 355). This also compelled his 
scrutiny of the unconscious and dreams. 
Writing The Ego and the Id in 1923, Freud explains his theory of the unconscious. 
Although this dissertation doesn’t use Freud to support or validate any of its 
assertions or findings, Freud’s text is of interest for its chapter on “Conscious and 
Unconscious”, and the manner in which it correlates with certain methods of John 
Lowes in analysing the “Rime” and “Kubla Khan”. Lowes wrote the first edition of 
The Road to Xanadu in 1927, which deals with Lowes’s fascination for the origin and 
content of the imagination poems of Coleridge. 
Lowes notes of his own content that it is written in a period of extensive focus on 
Freudian psychoanalysis (Lowes, 400n) which is relevant as some of Lowes’s 
analysis offers a now dated, but seminal psychological interpretation of the “Rime” 
and “Kubla Khan”. Lowes, however, marginalises Coleridge’s true range and genius 
by representing his imagination according to his vat reading, which amounted to his 
influences (Holmes, 1989, xv). Holmes’s judgement here, that Lowes represents 
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Coleridge by his influences from vast reading, is equivalent to Coleridge’s 
explanation of the fancy. Coleridge indicates that compared to the imagination, the  
 
Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with but fixities 
and definites. The Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory 
emancipated from the order of time and space; 
(BL I 305) 
 
Holmes surmises, with the word “influences”, that Lowes reduces the magnitude of 
Coleridge’s imaginative genius. Lowes does this by aligning the imagination poems 
too closely with fancy. This he uses to support his psychological interpretation of 
these poems. 
Freud divides the unconscious into two types: one is latent, “and is capable of 
becoming conscious”, the other is repressed, and of itsel  is not capable of becoming 
conscious. The first Freud terms “preconscious”, the second he terms “unconscious” 
(Strachey, 1961, 15). Freud notes that all that is repressed is unconscious, “but not all 
that is unconscious in repressed” (18). Lowes was aware of the danger of finding 
Freudian complexes in everything (Lowes, 400 n.), and admits that he is no 
psychologist, acknowledging that he is “playing with fire” in his use of the term 
“unconscious” (55). Unlike Freud, Lowes attends to its use in terms of what Coleridge 
called “the twilight realms of consciousness” (BL II 120, Lowes, 55) “in that shadowy 
half-being, that state of nascent Existence in the Twilight of Imagination and just on 
the vestibule of Consciousness” where ideas and images exist (19 July 1802, CL II 
814, Lowes 55). 
From this, it is evident that Lowes differs from Freud in his perspective on 
sublimated content. Lowes relished the idea that the “Rime” and “Kubla Khan” 
originated from a shadowy state of consciousness, and thus showed eager interest in 
finding links between the poems and Coleridge’s reading and experience during and 
before the writing of the poems. Lowes believed this content resurfaced in altered and 
randomly amalgamated states after a time in the unconscious (Lowes, 46). He 
elucidates, “But at the zenith of its power the creative energy is both conscious and 
unconscious in one and the same exercise––controllig consciously the throng of 
images which in the reservoir have undergone unconsci u  metamorphosis.” (104). 
Lowes queries the association of ideas in the “Rime”, and the way in which their 
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content resurfaced, in Coleridge’s mind, in altered an  randomly amalgamated states. 
Lowes questions 
 
whether those associations wrought their synthesis before the 
impressions so combined sank into the subliminal reservoir, or during 




Lowes was convinced that some form of subliminal union occurred, although he was 
uncertain where or how. Upon this point lies the basis of his analytical method, which 
he repeatedly applied in The Road to Xanadu. This method is inconclusive, but many 
of Lowes's renderings are illuminating. This unconscious metamorphosis Lowes 
termed the “gestation” of the “Rime” and “Kubla Khan” (46). The subliminal process 
and correspondingly its “birth” into consciousness is an idea found not only in Freud 
but in Coleridge himself, and are accounts of similar processes in the Biographia. In 
this Lowes capitalises on Coleridge’s concepts of the unconscious to broaden and 
enliven his theory.  
The impression itself: alternative analyses of the imagination poems 
There are a wide variety of analyses of Coleridge’s imagination poems by other 
critics, who are intrigued by the poems of heightened imagination. When first 
published, Coleridge’s poems of imagination were difficult to expound, because of 
their transcendent and mercurial nature. With time, th y moved further from their 
contemporary contexts, and hence exposition has becom  increasingly difficult. For 
example, William Ulmer welcomes the consideration that Wordsworth’s Borderers 
shaped the “Rime” through rhetorical influence. 
The “Rime” Ulmer suggests is a rhetorical response to the Borderers. In writing 
the latter Wordsworth analysed the politics and philosophy of William Godwin. His 
critique in turn borrows from earlier criticisms of Godwin by Coleridge (Ulmer, 2008, 
243). Consequently Ulmer contextualises Wordsworth’s play and Coleridge’s ballad 
 15
as political and moral discourse. Wordsworth represents Godwin through the 
character Rivers, whose “rhetorical power” and “moral relativism” was an 
“unacceptable morality” (239). Godwin’s doctrine incorporated the denial of moral 
obligation. This is based on his perspective of necessitarianism, that people are not 
responsible for their actions as their actions are c usally necessitated by nature (236). 
Rivers, Ulmer maintains, represented Godwin’s political theory with this 
“unacceptable morality”, which was then transferred by Coleridge into the “Rime”. 
Ulmer, like Lowes, imposes a specific interpretation on the “Rime”, in this instance 
that it represents ethical and political analogy. Ulmer has an advantage over Lowes, as 
he has the critical hindsight of numerous analyses developed throughout the twentieth 
century, whereas Lowes’s psychological theory mostly predated these analyses. 
By comparison, a further example of imposed analysis is from Lesa Corrigan, who 
supports Robert Penn Warren’s rendering of the “Rime”, as an allegory of “Original 
Sin” (Corrigan, 1999, 54). All of these analyses, despite their attraction to it, impose a 
method or an assumption on the “Rime”, that only explain it from a limited 
perspective. Ulmer examines the general features of G dwin’s philosophy, and 
applies this to the “Rime”. By comparison, Corrigan’s reference to Warren is 
theological but no less specific. Despite Warren’s lack of focus on Godwinism, 
Warren’s theological standpoint of original sin has a commonality with Ulmer. This is 
because the doctrine of Godwinism specifically opposes original sin, perceiving 
society and humanity as fundamentally good. Both of these analyses therefore 
acknowledge original sin as an element emphasised by Coleridge in the “Rime”. 
Warren sees it as an element used directly by Coleridg  to represent the Mariner’s 
circumstances. Ulmer, on the other hand intervenes in this argument, eager to enhance 
his inquiry that Coleridge used original sin as a device to describe Godwinian 
doctrine. By comparison, Coleridge’s explanation of the secondary imagination, and 
poetry related to it, refers to mercurial characteris ics such as “dissolving, diffusing” 
and “dissipating” (BL I 304), which elude clarification.  
Coleridge faced similar difficulties attempting to illuminate his own imagination 
poetry, and define these poems. He failed to retain their quicksilver-like indistinctness 
of form in order to continue writing them. No coordinates are present with which to 
define them further, beyond their characteristic as Romantic poetry and their 
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prevailing quality as imagination poetry. Coleridge’s own comments about the 
“Rime” reinforce this indistinctness. He describes it as “inexplicable”, 
“incomprehensible, and without head or tail” (BL I 28n). For these reasons Coleridge 
opted for explaining and analysing his poems of imagin tion theoretically, notably in 
the Biographia. Here occur ideas of Coleridge, with which Lowes’s theory correlates, 
about the imagination poems. Coleridge enhances his def nition of the imagination, 
using the immensity of an impression of St. Paul’s church: 
 
If, therefore, we suppose the absence of all interfer nce of the will, 
reason, and judgment, one or other of two consequences must result. 
Either the ideas (or relicts of such impression) will exactly imitate the 
order of the impression itself, which would be absolute delirium: or 
any one part of that impression might recall any other part, and (as 
from the law of continuity, there must exist in every total impression 
some one or more parts, which are components of some ther 
following total impression, and so on ad infinitum) any part of any 
impression might recal (sic) any part of any other, without a cause 
present to determine what it should be. 
(BL I 111-112) 
 
Concerning such impressions, and what Coleridge eagrly asserts is proof thereof, he 
gives the example of an illiterate “young woman” in Göttingen. In a fever, she 
“continued incessantly talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, in very pompous tones and 
with most distinct enunciation” (113). For a few years, in her childhood she had been 
under the care of a pastor who had read texts aloud in these languages, oblivious to 
her overhearing him. Coleridge resolves 
 
that no doubt could remain in any rational mind concer ing the true 
origin of the impressions made on her nervous system. 
This authenticated case furnishes both proof and instance, that reliques 
of sensation may exist for an indefinite time in a latent state, in the 
very same order in which they were originally impress d; 
(Ibid. 113) 
 
These impressions, scrutinized above, are independent of the will, as they stem from 
the unconscious. This is due to their assimilation with each other in the unconscious 
mind, wherein the will has no part. Later they resuface into the consciousness, which 
is also an activity independent of the will. Here then is a process of sublimated 
content, alluringly called “reliques of sensation” and “impressions”, by Coleridge, and 
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these resurface into the consciousness. Coleridge’s research into such possibilities of 
memory grew in part out of motivation from his longi  to complete the remainder of 
“Kubla Khan”. This resurfacing of content from the unconscious has similar 
characteristics to the theories proposed by Lowes about Coleridge’s poetics of 
imagination. However, Coleridge looked to examples, such as those above, to attempt 
an explanation of the poetics of his own imagination f r himself, but he never 
accomplished this to the extent of regaining his imaginative force. 
Coleridge continued to investigate the unconscious content of the mind. He 
suggests the possibility “that all thoughts are in themselves imperishable”. Continuing 
to explore this possibility, he argues  
 
that if the intelligent faculty should be rendered more comprehensive, 
it would require only a different and apportioned organization, the 
body celestial instead of the body terrestrial, to bring before every 
human soul the collective experience of its whole past existence. And 
this, this, perchance, is the dread book of judgment, in whose 
mysterious hieroglyphics every idle word is recorded! Yea, in the very 
nature of a living spirit, it may be more possible that heaven and earth 
should pass away, than that a single act, a single thought, should be 
loosened or lost from that living chain of causes, to all whose links, 
conscious or unconscious, the free-will, our only absolute self, is co-
extensive and co-present. 
(BL I 114) 
 
The intrigue of the potential capability of the unco scious is here theorised by 
Coleridge, referring, as in the passages quoted above, t  unconscious content, and its 
re-emergence, in a way similar to that of Lowes over a century later. 
Some contemporary critics search for ideas in the early poems of Coleridge 
through the interpretation of his later philosophical writings. Gian Orsini cautiously 
considers that this form of analysis uses the concepts of “subjectivity”, “objectivity”, 
and “unity in multeity” to explicate these poems. Orsini is aware that these describe 
the content of the poetry, and further claims, quoting M. F. Schulz, that they “confirm 
obliquely his [Coleridge’s] contention that he found in Kant and Schelling what his 
own predilections had already led him to.” Orsini regards this comment as “Oblique”, 
denouncing it with his argument that Coleridge’s bet poems, the “Rime” and “Kubla 
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Khan” require an aesthetic interpretation. With this sort of interpretation, “no system 
of philosophy can be derived from them, or is adequate to them” (Orsini, 1969, 41-2). 
By 1969, Orsini had encountered several non-aesthetic analyses of Coleridge’s 
poems of imagination. His willing assertion that philosophical systems can neither be 
applied to nor derived from these poems is true of th se who have attempted to do so, 
both those who predate and postdate Orsini. Coleridg ’s inability to sufficiently 
elucidate a method for the poetry of imagination, in the Biographia, or to expound a 
related system of philosophy justifies Orsini’s point. Even for Coleridge his own 
poetics of imagination eluded his attempted analysis of them, ever changing, never 
retaining a regular form and ever mercurial. This illuminates Lowes’s system of 
interpretation as informative, and is partly related o Coleridge’s own fascination with 
the unconscious, but it also reveals it as tenuous. This is because the “Rime” and 
“Kubla Khan” are beyond any interpretation using strict analogy, by virtue of their 
nature as poems of pure imagination. Their mercurial and transcendent characteristics 
do not tolerate analysis via analogy or psychology. It follows that Coleridge’s loss of 
imagination is in part due to the unfathomable and transcendent characteristics of the 
imagination poems that eluded his own attempts to repeat or substantially define 
them. To follow him in these attempts we now need, like him, and as hazardously, to 
turn to the problem of the will. 
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Chapter 2 
The secondary imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with 
the conscious will: the faculty of the will 
 
Coleridge’s extensive reference to the will includes its close association with the 
imagination. In his theories on these topics he considered the secondary imagination 
to echo the primary imagination, and to co-exist with the “conscious will” (BL I 304). 
He states this in the Biographia, published sixteen years after finishing his last poem 
of the imagination. Despite this time difference, this reference indicates the affinity of 
the will with the imagination in Coleridge’s explanation of the activity of the 
imagination. This is all the more pertinent to the imagination poems, as in Coleridge’s 
explanations of the imagination in the Biographia, he intends ultimately to elucidate 
how these poems were written. By extension the “cons i us will” coexistent with the 
secondary imagination is therefore essential to the production of the imagination 
poems. Coleridge refers to the imagination and its relation to the will and poetry 
further in the Biographia. Of the imagination he states, 
 
But in common language, and especially the subject of poetry, we 
appropriate the name to a superior degree of the faculty, joined to a 
superior voluntary controul (sic) over it. 
(BL I 125) 
 
The will is relevant and illuminating in the contex of the failure of Coleridge’s 
imagination due to its treatment under Kantian metaphysics. Converse to the will and 
its co-existence with the secondary imagination is the a priori supposition of the will 
as a metaphysical principle. Orsini refers to this principle in consequence of a 
Coleridge quote reminiscent of Schelling found in the Egerton MS. 2801 f. 104 
(Orsini, 236). As such Coleridge affirms the will as subject and object, and defines the 
following: 
 
Now, Will of Spirit contemplated finely, must fall under the 
predominance of Subject )-( Object––that is, must be conceived by the 
Understanding now as subjective, now as objective, in antithesis to the 
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Coleridge is dealing here with the will as subject and the will as object. Kant’s theory 
maintains that space and time are subjective and are forms of transcendental 
perception (Orsini, 92). Space and time, according to Kant’s theory, organise 
experience into an ordered whole, and perceived objects “are based on our subjective 
sensations, and framed by our intuitions of space and time” (92-3). These subjective 
sensations have the “thing-in-itself” as the element of experience (187). 
The Coleridge quotation above, in its reference to the will, sets out this 
philosophical approach to subjectify what is perceived rather than to objectify it, an 
approach which steered Coleridge away from empirical engagement and rendered his 
poetic force redundant. Accordingly Coleridge’s establishment of the will during his 
empirical focus of the 1790s was objectively grounded, and is different to the 
subjectively established will once he adopted German Idealism. Kant’s philosophy 
and German Idealism are both concerned with reason, but they differ in that Fichte 
attempted to remove the Kantian “thing-in-itself” and regarded experience as 
produced by the thinking subject (Kenny, 274). Despit  this difference the subjective 
approach that both take of philosophy had a mutual effect of occluding empirical 
interaction and rendering Coleridge’s poetic access ineffective. 
Coleridge’s loss of imagination occurred in the early stages of his research into 
German Idealism, which gained momentum while he visited Göttingen. His 
fascination with Immanuel Kant increased shortly thereafter. Kant gives the will close 
attention, and so too does German Idealism, althoug to a lesser extent than Kant. 
Coleridge had given the will some attention prior to his adoption of German Idealism, 
but thereafter, his ideas concerning the will shifted. Combined with his later 
abandonment of necessitarianism, referred to later, his concept of the will shifted 
further. What follows details Coleridge’s concept of the will, and ideologies relating 
to the will, and how these differed before and after his adoption of German Idealism. 
Coleridge paid constant attention to philosophy, sociol gy, politics, epistemology 
and religion and was greatly intrigued with the will in these contexts, and its 
relationship to reason, understanding and imaginatio . In numerous instances in his 
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Marginalia, and in his own texts, he refers to the will. He attended to its importance 
and reasserted it until his death in 1834. In these, so frequently is the subject of the 
will mentioned that James Engell considers any scrutiny of Coleridge’s psychological 
and religious examinations after 1815 to necessitate a close regard for the will for 
them to be grasped correctly (Engell, 2002, 66.).  
Thus, Coleridge’s understanding of the will is detail d and vast, with numerous 
references to it appearing throughout his writings, any analysis of which requires 
specific attention. His texts, written between 1801 and 1834, require caution in 
associating Coleridge’s ideas and perspectives of the will to the imagination poems. 
This is because the poems of heightened imagination predate the majority of his 
references to the will. For this reason his concept of the will at the time of writing the 
poems of imagination does not necessarily reflect his renderings of the will thereafter. 
Accordingly Coleridge had a lifelong attraction to the will and it was regularly a 
subject of his attention. 
A subject in which the will plays a role is necessitarianism, which is important to 
this thesis because at the time that Coleridge wrote the imagination poems, he was a 
necessitarian. William Ulmer regards necessitarianism as the doctrine of a “chain of 
events” predetermined by causation (Ulmer, 236). Here causation is the natural force 
involved in the circumstance. William Godwin incorpated necessitarianism into his 
doctrine, which he developed with radical proposals for change to society, politics, 
epistemology, religion and economics. Necessitarianism however, is not synonymous 
with Godwinism, but Godwinism incorporated necessitarianism into its fundamental 
basis. 
Coleridge’s necessitarian beliefs had affected his political and religious outlook in 
the 1790s, and had complemented his belief in pantisocracy. Writing to Southey in 
1794 he claimed to be a “complete Necessitarian”, uderstanding “the subject as well 
almost as Hartley himself” (11 December 1794, CL I 137). Years later, in 1796 he 
wrote to John Thelwall, whilst categorising “vice” and the classification of “sinners”, 
“We mean these men when we say––Men of bad principles. ––––Guilt is out of the 
Question––I am a Necessitarian, and of course deny the possibility of it” (13 May 
1796, CL I 213). Here he denies personal responsibility and“bad principles” on 
account of predetermined causation. Coleridge at this ime, in 1796, had just 
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abandoned pantisocracy, which had included a necessitarian outlook in its philosophy 
and theology. However, he took more time to abandon necessitarianism altogether. 
His marriage to Sara Fricker, and the poems of imagnation, soon to be written, 
occurred within this necessitarian paradigm. 
The necessitarian interpretation of the will, influenced and determined by 
causation, is a prominent focus of several theorists in Coleridge’s time. Coleridge’s 
necessitarianism rested on a theistic outlook, not an atheistic standpoint. Godwin’s 
atheistic necessitarianism was accordingly different to that of Coleridge’s theistic 
necessitarianism. Coleridge claimed that an atheistic view of necessitarianism 
rendered men “outcasts of a blind idiot called Nature / ruled by a fatal Necessity” as 
opposed to “the children of an all-wise and infinitely good God” (18 January, 1796, 
CL I 177). Consequently even in the case of necessitarianism, in which Coleridge and 
Godwin did agree, their perspectives of it were from pposite ends of its theistic 
range. Another point on which they agreed was their stance against materialism, 
found in Godwin’s doctrine and Coleridge’s adherence to pantisocracy. This is 
evident in Coleridge’s reminiscence of this political and social system, after its 
abandonment, in a letter to Southey wherein he refers to the removal of the “selfish 
principle” from themselves and to undertake the “abolition of property”, as he named 
it (13 November 1795, CL I 163), resulting in communal property. This demonstrates 
that Coleridge continued against materialism subsequent to abandoning pantisocracy. 
William Godwin’s doctrine, where it concerned necessitarianism, did not entirely 
deny free-will, but limited the will to the confines of necessity. Hence he believed the 
will to be causally necessitated (Ulmer, 236). In the context of necessitarianism, the 
will is limited to the extent that necessity allows it to act, as espoused by numerous 
empiricists. 
The theories of Godwin, Priestly and Hartley, amongst many others, had in part 
informed and motivated pantisocracy, and all had theories approving 
necessitarianism. Coleridge had never been completely partial to Godwin, admitting 
to Southey, in 1794, that he did not quite share his high opinion of Godwin (21 
October 1794, CL I 115). Coleridge’s attitude to Godwin became more adverse once 
he abandoned this political and social system. He wrote to Benjamin Fowler, 
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My answer to Godwin will be a six-shilling Octavo; and is designed to 
shew not only the absurdities and wickedness of his System, but to 
depict what appear to me the defects of all the system  of morality 
before and since Christ. 
(11 December 1796, CL I 267, Graham) 
 
Two months later he wrote his opinions of several people, stating of Godwin’s theory, 
“I abominate Godwinism” (6 February 1797, CL, i, 306). The year before writing 
“Dejection: An Ode” Coleridge wrote to Thomas Poole in 1801, declaring that he has 
overthrown many of his previous philosophical beliefs: 
 
If I do not greatly delude myself, I have not only completely 
extricated the notions of Time and Space; but have overthrown the 
doctrine of Association, as taught by Hartley, and with it all the 
irreligious metaphysics of modern Infidels——especially the doctrine 
of Necessity—This I have done. 
(16 March 1801, CL II 706, Orsini) 
 
This emphasises that Coleridge abandoned necessitarianism at a similar time to his 
philosophical shift to German Idealism. This abandonment also corresponds to the 
period in which he lost his imaginative force. His extrication of time and space leads 
to a priori metaphysics. This disengagement from Hartley occurs because the 
empirical doctrines Coleridge held when he wrote the imagination poems gave way to 
the doctrines of German Idealism. The doctrines of Hartley and other empiricists 
complemented imagination poetry. Coleridge’s decision to overthrow these doctrines 
is due to the influence of German philosophy on him. As a result the primary reason 
for his loss of poetic force is this philosophical shift. 
Once Coleridge had committed his attention to German Idealism, he encapsulated 
his opinion of empiricism in 1801, Orsini states, in an explication of its worst 
consequences, namely atheism and infidelity. In particular he looked at Hobbes and 
Gassendi, who believed that “[a]ll knowledge & rational Belief were derived from 
experience—we had no experience of a God, or a future state—therefore there could 
be no rational Belief” (February 1801, CL II 701, Orsini, 67). 
Coleridge was concerned that necessitarianism, onceit had gone too far led to a 
disbelief in moral obligation. William Ulmer discerns the character Rivers in 
Wordsworth’s Borderers as an atheist, and eagerly claims that Wordsworth parodied 
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Godwin with Rivers in this play. Ulmer quotes Godwin’s claim, in Political Justice, 
that “the assassin cannot help the murder he commits any more than the dagger” 
(Priestley, 1946, 232, Ulmer, 236). Thus, an extreme form of necessitarianism could 
rule out personal accountability for one’s actions. 
As Coleridge increasingly became familiar with and approved of the philosophical 
doctrines of Kant, he was immersed in a system that dis greed with necessitarianism. 
In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant explains, about the power of 
choice, 
 
Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a
moral sense, whether good or evil, he is or is to become. Either 
condition must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he could 
not be held responsible for it and could therefore be morally neither 
good nor evil. 
(Greene, 1934, 40) 
 
Coleridge’s overthrowing of necessity agrees with Kant’s assertion about the 
individual’s freedom of moral choice. Coleridge reiterates this explanation of Kant in 
Aids to Reflection, published in 1825, which demonstrates his consistency in 
abandoning necessitarianism in 1801. 
 
The Will is ultimately self-determined, or it is no l nger a Will under 
the law of perfect Freedom, but a Nature under the mechanism of 
Cause and Effect. 
(AR 285) 
 
Coleridge’s close Hartleyan focus lasted until it was superseded by German Idealism. 
A prominent idea within Hartley’s philosophy that fascinated Coleridge was 
“mechanical” psychology, and its associated philosophy. Stephen Prickett explains 
that Hartley’s “mechanical” psychology (mechanistic theory of association) perceived 
the human mind “as a thing, passive and cumulative in its organisation” (Prickett, 
1970, 44). Both Locke and Hartley agreed with the concept of the tabula rasa of the 
passive mind, stimulated externally. Coleridge and Wordsworth, in contrast, saw the 
mind as “active and originating” (44). Hartley attempted to analogise the principles of 
physical science onto the mind, and he perceived mankind as a thing wherein religion 
and intellect were mechanised (33-4). These principles of Hartley, Coleridge ousted 
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with organism and dialectic that are two opposing models. Prickett maintains that 
these two elements were the polarities that Coleridg  attempted to incorporate into the 
Biographia (46-9). Prickett explains that Coleridge only accepted Hartley “so long as 
he could believe that he offered an adequate scientific explanation not merely of his 
own creativity, but also his consciousness of value.” This Coleridge rejected when he 
realised that physical science was incapable of doing this by its very nature (49). All 
of this rests on Coleridge’s attention to organism and its association with mechanism, 
which Hartley considered one and the same (Fairer, 17) and that Coleridge 
emphasises in his Romantic poetry of the 1790s. 
Concerning the changes that Romanticism caused at this time, David Fairer quotes 
Morse Peckham’s enquiry about the identity of Romanticism: that “it is the revolution 
in the European mind against thinking in terms of static mechanism and the 
redirection of the mind to thinking in terms of dynamic organicism” (17). This 
Romantic organicism originated in German Idealism, Fairer recognises, clarifying that 
Coleridge did not perceive organicism as a fact of nature, but as a means to thinking 
about wholes (27). Prior to this perception of organicism, is Coleridge’s organic 
perception of identity, motivated by “Locke’s organic concept of identity” (46), which 
Coleridge held throughout the 1790s, and that comple ented his empirical standpoint. 
While Coleridge interacted with Romanticism and its organicism, he kept in step 
with his typical characteristic for contradiction. Soon after he claimed to have 
abandoned Hartley’s philosophy he praised the metaphysics of Hartley, in a letter 
seven months after writing to Thomas Poole in 1801. Coleridge’s opinion swung back 
and forth until finally he rejects Hartley permanently in the Biographia (Orsini, 22). 
However, Coleridge had a less variable opinion of Berkeley’s empiricism. 
Consequently, Coleridge displays relative philosophical stability during the writing of 
the imagination poems, but shows growing indecision about empiricism as he adopts 
German Idealism. Hartley significantly influenced Coleridge at the time he was 
writing the poems of imagination, despite Coleridge’s trust in Hartley’s empiricism 
steadily declining at this time, in which Berkeley gained prominence. 
Lawrence Hanson, who observes that in 1794 Coleridg’s focus was on Hartley the 
“Necessitarian and Believer”, plots changes Coleridge made to his philosophical 
outlook. Hartley’s materialist elements he shifted from, but not his thinking in 
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general. By 1796, Berkley’s empiricist influences began gaining precedence alongside 
Hartley, becoming by 1798 his primary focus (Hanson, 1938, 300). Hanson elucidates 
Hartley’s survival in Coleridge’s philosophical estimation, although he estimates that 
Kant eventually replaced him (350). This is a generalised truth, as several comments 
made by Coleridge indicate repeated approval of Hartley followed by denunciation of 
him until eventually, after the Biographia, he threw him off entirely (Orsini, 22). 
Coleridge’s closest philosophical guide throughout his espousal of pantisocracy 
was Hartley, but concurrent with his relinquishment of it in 1795, is his shift from 
Hartley to Berkeley. Soon Berkeley was his primary empirical focus, but he retained 
Hartley, though he was of reduced value to him (33). This correlates with the writing 
of the imagination poetry and his conversation poems written in the 1790s. The 
empirical philosophy of Hartley and Berkeley was accordingly complementary to 
imagination poetry, and as empiricists, they did not emphasise metaphysics or 
rationalism. Coleridge followed Berkeley’s doctrine from the 1780s through to his last 
days, but within this period, from 1796-8 he gave prominent attention to Berkeley. 
Between September 1798, when Coleridge left for Germany, and his return in July 
1799, his philosophical outlook shifted. This shift is the gradual abandonment of 
empiricism, dominated by Berkeley’s doctrine, and the steady adoption of German 
Idealism. Although this shift was not sudden, and took several years, it was underway 
on this visit to Germany. However, Kant's influence occurs later, once Coleridge is 
already immersed in German Idealism. 
Orsini objects to any shift happening at this time, and mentions that only several 
months earlier Coleridge showed no signs of having a y familiarity with German 
Idealist philosophy (48-9). This, Orsini accepts, indicates that Coleridge’s knowledge 
of Kant post-dated Coleridge’s studies in Göttingen, and therefore post-dated his loss 
of imagination, and had no part in it. 
However, Coleridge did marginally know Kant’s philosophy before his time in 
Germany. Coleridge’s familiarity with Kant began at least as early as May 1796, 
Norman Fruman suggests, when his attitude to the philosopher was “the most 
unintelligible Emanuel Kant” (CL I 284n, Fruman, 1971, 82). Familiarity, at this time, 
was limited, whereas Coleridge refers to Kant as “the illustrious sage of Köningsberg” 
years later in 1799 (BL II 153). However, he only started a serious study of Kant in 
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1801 at the earliest (Fruman, 82-3). This indicates that it was Coleridge’s obsession 
with the analytical philosophy of German Idealism in general that shifted his 
imagination, rather than the exclusive influence of Kant. Concerning Kant’s later 
influence on Coleridge, Orsini affirms, in 1969, that it was substantial: 
 
If one were to enumerate the works of Coleridge in which ideas of 
Kant are adopted or discussed, one would have to lis  all the prose 
works of Coleridge published by him in the nineteenth century, plus 
his letters and notebooks, only now being published in their entirety. 
(Orsini, 50) 
 
During his residence in Germany Coleridge’s universal interests took precedence over 
his attention to Kant. Coleridge’s universal range of interests is notable, as he wrote 
on a wide variety of topics. The numerous works he int nded to write allude to this, as 
he explained to Joseph Cottle, referring enthusiastically to one of his more ambitious 
ideas, one that also demonstrates his extensive rang  of enquiry: 
 
I should not think of devoting less than 20 years to an Epic Poem. Ten 
to collect materials and warm my mind with universal cience. I 
would be a tolerable Mathematician, I would thoroughly know 
Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Optics, and Astronomy, Botany, Metallurgy, 
Fossilism, Chemistry, Geology, Anatomy, Medicine––then the mind 
of man––then the minds of men––in Travels, Voyages and Histories. 
So I would spend ten years––the next five to the composition of the 
poem––and the last five to the correction of it. 
(Early April 1797, CL I 320-1) 
 
While Coleridge was in Göttingen, Orsini notes, he took courses in natural history, 
physiology, the New Testament and the Gothic language, but nothing on Kant, despite 
its availability as a lecture topic (Orsini, 46). It is suggested that Coleridge knew little 
Kantian philosophy while in Germany (Magnusson, 1988, 145); despite this there is 
further contrary evidence that his knowledge of Kant was then adequate (Hanson, 
300). Coleridge did refer to Kant in conversation whilst there. Carolyn recalled a 
discussion between Coleridge and a German girl, whom he astonished with his 
understanding of a Kantian text in her language, which was unfathomable to her 
(300). Concerning his ability to converse in the German language Coleridge wrote to 
Thomas Poole in 1799, 
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On very trivial, and on metaphysical Subjects I cantalk tolerably––so, 
so!––but in that conversation, which is between both, I bungle most 
ridiculously. 
(4 January 1799, CL I 453) 
 
The date of this letter, 4 January, is the month prior to Coleridge attending lectures in 
Göttingen. Years later, in the Biographia, Coleridge’s study of German Idealism and 
Kant is demonstrated, and is preferred to Hartley. In it a priori elucidations from Kant 
are found. In Chapter VII, Coleridge criticises the proponents of Hartley for 
“mistaking the conditions of a thing for its causes and essence; and the process by 
which we arrive at the knowledge of a faculty, for the faculty itself” (BL I 123). This 
criticism is also characteristic of German Idealism as it focuses on the thinking 
subject and not on the thing-in-itself. Without direct reference to German Idealism, he 
here demonstrates its replacement of the doctrines of Hartley. This serves as an 
example of how his thoughts developed from his stayin Germany into the nineteenth 
century. This adherence to German Idealism and analytical philosophy was underway 
when Coleridge returned to England, and he introduce  this tradition into Britain 
(Cobban, 1929, 160). Coleridge’s imaginative force was thus lost, not through neglect 
but through his change in philosophical focus. 
One hour was thine––thou’st had thy will: the activity of the will 
Coleridge’s imagination failed when he came under the influence of German 
Idealism. Increasingly Coleridge interpreted the will according to the subjectivity of 
the metaphysics of Kant and German Idealism. It is thi  that steered him away from 
objectively focussed engagement with the will through empirical philosophy, and 
caused his poetic access to end. Despite the coexistence of the secondary imagination 
with the “conscious will” (BL I 304), it follows that this relationship is only effective 
if the will is engaged empirically. 
The will is active in Coleridge’s conversation poems, which he wrote from the 
second half of the 1790s until 1806. Frederick Burwick asserts, in his article 
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“Coleridge’s Conversation Poems: Thinking the Thinker”, that the conversation 
poems have a close affinity to the will (Burwick, 2008, 169). Coleridge developed the 
activity of the will in these poems from “The Eolian Harp” in 1795, to “Dejection: An 
Ode” in 1802. The importance of the will in these poems is that from the earlier poem 
to the later poem, the role of the will progresses from its passive reference to its active 
reference (169). The conversation poems from “This Lime-tree Bower my Prison”, 
written in July 1797, to “The Nightingale”, written in April to May 1798, align 
chronologically with the poems of imagination. 
As a subject, the will occurs in the imagination poems, but its role is different to 
that of the conversation poems. The relevance of the will in the poems of heightened 
imagination is mainly in the loss of agency. 
Of great philosophical wonder to Coleridge was the self, the “I” and “me”. The 
recurrence of the word “me” in section six of “Dejection: An Ode” reinforces that 
Coleridge associates his loss of imaginative force with his own philosophical volition. 
Combined with this is his attention to the will, defining volition and conscious effort. 
Conceptually the conversation poems develop the purpose of the will, traced by 
Burwick (169). The will as a result experiences chronological growth in the 
conversation poems, whereas in the poems of imagination it is a stable entity 
depicting loss of agency. 
Burwick associates the development of the will in the conversation poems with 
Coleridge’s rejection on 23 March 1801 of the philosophical materialism of Locke 
and Newton for describing the mind as “always passive – a lazy Looker-on.” (CL II 
709, Burwick, 169). Tracing the development of this conclusion, Burwick begins with 
“The Eolian Harp”, written in 1795, in which no effort of will is necessary in the lines 
 
And tranquil muse upon tranquillity; 
Full many a thought uncalled and undetained, 
And many idle flitting phantasies, 
Traverse my indolent and passive brain, 
(PW I i 233, ll. 38-41) 
 
By inference, Coleridge’s use of the will pertains to any deliberate action, but 
contains no dynamic range beyond this, with passivity as its opposite. On the next 
conversation poem, “Reflections on Having Left a Plce of Retirement”, written in 
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1796, Burwick comments that the “auditor must not listen passively” (Burwick, 170). 
This requires active listening to the skylark: 
 
“The inobtrusive song of Happiness–– 
“Unearthly minstrelsy! then only heard 
“When the Soul seeks to hear; when all is hush'd, 
“And the Heart listens!” 
(PW I i 262, ll. 23-6) 
 
The self is a focus of Coleridge in these poems, and he ties it in directly with the will. 
He develops the self and structurally forges it so hat its operation is conducive to the 
will in such renderings as these, primarily in the context of perception and how the 
self perceives what is perceivable. 
Coleridge includes the activity of the will, and therefore also perception, further in 
“This Lime-Tree Bower my Prison” the following year. Of this Burwick explains, “no 
matter how glorious the scene, the revelation occurs only with a committed act of 
perception” (Burwick, 170).  
 
                                                 Somy Friend 
Struck with deep joy may stand, as I have stood, 
Silent with swimming sense; yea, gazing round 
On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem 
Less gross than bodily: and of such hues 
As veil the Almighty Spirit, when he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence. 
(PW I i 352, ll. 37-43) 
 
With this as an example, the perspective of the will is further emphasised 
characterising deliberate action. 
Burwick recognises that in the four years between “The Nightingale” and 
“Dejection: An Ode”, spanning April 1798 to April 1802, Coleridge “affirmed joy” in 
the former only to lapse into “despair” in the latter (Burwick, 177). Burwick’s 
examples respectively state, 
 
Nature's sweet voices, always full of love 
And joyance! 'Tis the merry Nightingale 
That crowds, and hurries, and precipitates 
With fast thick warble his delicious notes, 
As he were fearful that an April night 
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Would be too short for him to utter forth 
His love-chant, and disburthen his full soul 
Of all its music! 
(PW I i 518, ll. 42-49) 
 
       My genial spirits fail, 
       And what can these avail, 
To lift the smoth’ring weight from off my breast? 
(PW I ii 699, ll. 39-41) 
 
In the conversation poems, Coleridge develops the perce tion as the will becomes 
more assertive. Hence in “Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement” active 
listening is required (Burwick, 170); “then only heard//When the Soul seeks to hear; 
when all is hush'd,//And the Heart listens!” Coleridge develops the will 
chronologically in the conversation poems, and accordingly develops the perception.  
Coleridge’s development of the will in the conversation poems includes its 
progressive activity. However they do not represent Coleridge’s developing 
understanding of the will, but instead depict how he develops his representation of the 
will. These poems also express an idea of the will and its function limited to the 
context of perceptive effort and deliberate action. 
Several categories of will exist in the context of the range of Coleridge’s writing, 
that result from his variety of interests. For example, there is the autonomous free-will 
expounded by Kant, as opposed to the necessitarian w ll subject to underlying 
controls necessitated by existence and function. 
Coleridge’s application of the will in the conversation poems does not correlate 
directly with his use of the will in the imagination poems. In these, the will becomes 
evident through the loss of volition and reduced personal agency. Christabel’s agency 
and ability to act diminishes progressively as Geraldine advances herself in the castle. 
 
A Star hath set, a Star hath risen, 
O Geraldine! since Arms of thine 
Have been the lovely Lady’s Prison. 
O Geraldine! One hour was thine–– 
Thou’st had thy will! 
(PW I i 492, ll. 305-6) 
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Geraldine’s coercion causes Christabel to lose volition. Christabel continues to 
perceive the circumstances, but her will has reduce freedom to act. In the “Rime”, 
the “storm-blast” blows the ship south, 
 
And now the storm-blast came, and he 
Was tyrannous and strong: 
He struck with his o’ertaking wings, 
And chased us south along. 
(PW I i 375-377, ll. 41-44) 
 
The Mariner’s volition diminishes progressively. The “storm-blast” sends the ship far 
off course, and once the Mariner kills the Albatross, his last remaining volition is 
spent. Nevertheless, he incurs moral responsibility for the killing, and becomes an 
opposite to Godwin’s necessitarianism that incurs no moral responsibility. 
Coleridge’s definition of fancy best describes the id as of Godwin and Hume on 
the will, in which fancy remains reliant on empirically based impressions obtained a 
posteriori. Of fancy Coleridge states, 
 
FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but 
fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of 
memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is 
blended with, and modified by that empirical phaenomenon of the 
will, which we express by the word Choice. But equally with the 
ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materi ls ready made 
from the law of association. 
(BL I 305) 
 
Constantly overlooked, as Engell notices, “Coleridge emphasises that no material or 
associationist theory accounts for the power of the will, ‘our absolute self’’’ (Engell, 
66). This complements Coleridge’s interpretation of the fancy and imagination, where 
fancy is a choice made between already extant objects and images, whereas the 
imagination experiences control from the will. This al o hints at why the imagination 
poems of Coleridge are able to assert the self. 
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Wandering mazes lost: Calvinism, necessitarianism and free-will 
Coleridge’s concepts of the will align closely with his theology and his ideas of the 
self, and his thoughts on the will cannot be analysed outside of these perspectives. 
Coleridge’s qualification of the will extends to defining it in relation to his point of 
view of Christianity and God. For certain purposes, he calls God the “Absolute will”. 
He commented much concerning the will in his marginal notes on the works of Jakob 
Böhme, whose works he acquired in 1808. Coleridge was familiar with Böhme’s 
works prior to this year, and had known about them since his school days, and he 
included a journal entry in 1795 that he intended to write about Böhme, indicating 
serious enquiry into Böhme’s works (CM VI 554). In one marginal note on Böhme 
Coleridge affirms “that the Absolute will becomes the Paternal Mind = the Father 
Almighty” (696). Coleridge enthusiastically analysed the will, and developed his own 
understanding of it, when he found it conceptualised by others. 
Coleridge continuously explicated the will in his tex s, and amalgamated the 
secondary imagination as co-existent with the “consious will”. This emphasis of his 
asserts their inseparability, although they are not synonymous. Throughout his texts 
and marginalia that concern the will, he clarifies the activity of the will. Its context in 
relation to the secondary imagination, agency, consi u ness and perception is mostly 
unsaid in these texts, but this context remains pertinent all the same. Böhme’s works 
primarily induced Coleridge to interpret the will from a theological perspective. 
The theological viewpoint of the will included the d bate between the doctrines of 
Calvinism and free-will that was prominent and ongoi  throughout the eighteenth 
century. One of Coleridge’s distinctive points of scrutiny on the will is the debate 
between free-will and Calvinism. This is a theological debate, but Calvinism contains 
similarities to the doctrine of necessitarianism. Where the doctrine of necessitarianism 
is a chain of events predetermined by natural or divine causation, the doctrine of 
Calvinism is substantiated by a chain of events predetermined by God. By extension 
Calvinism is in some respects a type of necessitarianism. Calvinism accordingly holds 
to the doctrine of predestination, and fixed-fate for humanity, which has developed 
conceptually and ranged across several definitions of necessity by Coleridge’s time. 
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The theological debate between Calvinism and free-will as exemplified in the 
eighteenth century by the debate between the Wesleyan Methodists and the Anglican 
and Calvinistic Methodist churches. It most prominently occurred in the Wesley–
Whitfield debates. In the context of religious denominations adhering to Calvinism 
Coleridge refers to “the progress of Methodists, and other disciples of Calvinism” 
(Watchman 12-13, Canuel, 87), thus referring to the Calvinist c Methodists. 
Theologically the debate between free-will and predestination Coleridge 
distinguished early in life. He recalled this in the Biographia in which he laments the 
fruitless conversations he pursued with this debate as his focus. His childhood 
sentiment to this he explains: 
 
In my friendless wanderings on our leave-days (for I was an orphan, 
and had scarce any connections in London), highly was I delighted, if 
any passenger, especially if he were drest in black, would enter into 
conversation with me. For I soon found the means of directing it to my 
favourite subjects 
 
Of providence, fore-knowledge, will, and fate, 
Fix’d fate, free will, fore-knowledge absolute, 
And found no end in wandering mazes lost. 
 
This preposterous pursuit was, beyond doubt, injurious, both to my 
natural powers, and to the progress of my education. 
(BL I 16) 
 
Without siding with either option, he criticises the whole free-will vs. fixed-fate 
debate, considering such disputes futile. In a margin l note on The Pilgrim’s Progress 
he calls this debate “the error and hollowness of the Antithesis between Liberty and 
Necessity” (CM I 827). The Biographia passage quoted above also reveals Coleridge’s 
early fascination with philosophical and religious subjects and discussion. Here 
however philosophical debate and metaphysics, he surmi es, are impaired by 
Calvinistic sentiment, which he finds most at fault. David Riede regards this reference 
as concerning Coleridge’s political, philosophical and in particular religious pursuits 
(Riede, 1991, 203). Although Riede’s conclusion is correct and relevant, the entire 
quotation deals with will, fate and predestination, all elements pertinent to Calvinism. 
Coleridge’s reluctance to use the word “Calvinism” in this quote has to do with 
theology in his time grappling with several working definitions of “Calvinism”, all of 
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which were interrelated. This resulted in the potential for misrecognition of a 
theologically sensitive topic important to him. He describes Calvinism without 
identifying it as such, and by doing so he asserts his specific view on Calvinism, and 
avoids extra explanation. He therefore coerces his reader to identify the characteristics 
of what he disapproves, and only after that they recognise and associate them with 
Calvinism, by themselves. This consequently alleviat s misrecognition. John Bunyan 
wrote an editorial comment that preceded The Pilgrim’s Progress, which concerns 
Bunyan’s own Calvinism. To this Coleridge responded with, 
 
If by “metaphysics” we mean those truths of the pure Reason, 
which always transcend and not seldom appear to contradict, the 
Understanding––or (in the words of the great Apostle) spiritual 
verities which can only be spiritually discerned––/ and this is the 
true and legitimate meaning of “Metaphysics”, i.e. µετα τα φυσικα/ 
then, I affirm, that this very controversy between the Arminians 
and the Calvinists, in which both are partially right in what they 
affirm, and both wholly wrong in what they deny, is a proof that 
without Metaphysics there can be no Light of Faith. 
(CM I 819-20) 
 
Coleridge’s non-conformist attitude to the Calvinist debate occurs once more here, but 
the Kantian borrowing and explication of metaphysics s illuminated. He gives 
metaphysics a spiritual role here, that of defining things only spiritually discerned, and 
incorporates “understanding” as a synonym of it. 
Calvinism, as a setback, framed Coleridge’s early exist nce. Although he does not 
discredit it on certain points, the Calvinistic debate he generally sees as pointless and 
misleading. His quote about “wandering mazes lost” alludes to how Calvinism 
motivated his early sense of himself in relation to society, religion and the identity of 
the individual. Accordingly topics about will, providence and fate have a far-reaching 
grasp on the individual’s self-perception, and their r lation to society. Lost time in 
“mazes lost” was the result of Coleridge’s focus on this debate, and the activity of 
debating such a doctrine gained him nothing, dealing him educational and spiritual 
hurt. In relation to this Coleridge says of Calvinism, 
 
It is of vital importance for a theological Student to understand 
clearly the utter diversity of the Lutheran, which is likewise the 
Calvinistic denial of Free will in the Unregenerate and the doctrine 
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of the modern Necessitarians and…of the later Calvinists, which 
denies the proper existence of will altogether. Theformer is sound 
scriptural, compatible with the divine justice, a new, yea, a mighty 
motive to morality, & finally, the dictate of common Sense 
grounded on common Experience. The latter the very contrary of 
all these. 
(CM III 737, Beer, 2002, 217) 
 
Here Coleridge separates early Calvinism from later Calvinism, the distinction he 
avoided in the Biographia passage quoted above. He approves of the early Calvinistic 
“denial of Free will in the Unregenerate”. This also demonstrates theological opinion 
changes that he made that correspond with the transition from his earlier theologically 
radical perspectives to his later religious conservatism. 
Reflecting in the Biographia on his errors in theology, Coleridge recalled his tour 
for the periodical work, The Watchman, 
 
For I was most sincere, most disinterested! My opini ns were indeed 
in many and most important points erroneous; but my heart was 
single. Wealth, rank, life itself then seemed cheap to me, compared 
with the interests of (what I believed to be) the truth, and the will of 
my maker. I cannot even accuse myself of having been actuated by 
vanity; for in the expansion of my enthusiasm I didnot think of myself 
at all.  
(BL I 180) 
 
Here, unlike his reference to childhood, he was sati fied with his errors, doing what he 
perceived as the will of his “Maker”. The change here is his focus on divine will rather 
than the Calvinistic debate about it, in which he engaged in his youth. Coleridge ranks 
his own erroneous wanderings, in this theological doctrine, as non-injurious here on 
the grounds of his sincerity. This, although his Christian conviction is misguided, 
ranks as a form of marred virtue, in his concept of theology and perception of what the 
Christian individual should be. He describes his errors as a philosophical 
trinitarianism, but religious unitariainism and philanthropy (180). Immediately after 
this reference Coleridge refers to an interaction he had with a Calvinist in 
Birmingham. He describes the incident, but reveals nothing more about his actual 
stance towards Calvinism. However, it asserts that e strongly opposed the 
manifestation of Calvinism in this person. He had already dealt with his opinion of 
Calvinism at the beginning of the Biographia, and need not repeat himself: 
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My campaign commenced at Birmingham; and my first attack was on 
a rigid Calvinist, a tallow-chandler by trade. He was a tall dingy 
man…O that face!…the countenance lank, dark, very hard, and with 
strong perpendicular furrows, gave me a dim notion of some one 
looking at me through a used gridiron! But he was one of the 
thorough-bred, a true lover of liberty, and…had proved to the 
satisfaction of many, that Mr. Pitt was one of the horns of the second 
beast in THE REVELATIONS, that spake as a dragon. 
(BL I 180) 
 
Describing the tallow-chandler as “one of the thorough-bred”, Coleridge’s irony 
deprecates a particular Calvinistic view of election, as a perceived state under grace 
foreordained for the tallow-chandler personally. Extending the irony “a true lover of 
liberty” points to foreknowledge and fixed fate kin to endless “mazes lost”. This 
explains the damage caused to the self and the will through the particular Calvinistic 
reasoning that “denies the proper existence of will altogether”, in which Coleridge sees 
in the tallow-chandler the same gridiron perceived by himself as a youth. This denotes 
the damage caused to the self with its natural powers, and to society through 
perpetuation of this Calvinistic “gridiron”. His social interaction was also injured. 
Primarily his objections to this form of Calvinism are its role in impeding Christianity 
and Romantic subjectivity, and hence are injurious t  his “natural powers”. 
Recalling these opinions and occasions, Coleridge describes himself existing in a 
state of imaginative bankruptcy as a youth that he lat r overcame. In so doing, the 
foundation for Coleridge’s later imagination poems remained undamaged. Later 
injury was done to his imagination through “the unwholesome quicksilver mines of 
metaphysic” coupled with the rationalistically orientated philosophy he pursued from 
1799 onward. This he did not unravel or plough through. This however led him to 
apply his genius in philosophical, sociological, political, epistemological and religious 
writings that also emphasised his extraordinary range of ability. 
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And I bless’d them unaware: theological interpretations of the will 
Coleridge agrees, in a marginal note, to a statement by Jakob Böhme that “every Man 
is free, and is as a God to himself; he may change and alter himself in this Life either 
into Wrath, or into Light”; Coleridge considers “all guilt is in and of the will ” (CM I 
605). He surmises here that people are aware of their guilt and it is not inadvertent. 
The Mariner bears guilt for killing the albatross, and while “[a]lone on a wide wide 
sea” (PW I i 391, ll. 233), he looks “upon the rotting deck//And there the dead men 
lay” (242-3) whereupon he finds himself unable to pray. His volition is thus impaired: 
 
I looked to heaven, and tried to pray; 
But or ever a prayer had gusht, 
A wicked whisper came, and made 
My heart as dry as dust. 
(PW I i 391, ll. 244-47) 
 
In a marginal note in the Book of Common Prayer, Coleridge affirms that “Prayer is
Faith passing into act––a union of the will and the Intellect realizing in an intellectual 
act” (CM I 701). By extension the Mariner’s will is impaired but not his intellect. His 
affection for the water-snakes breaks the preceding spell, and this inadvertent 
sympathy induces his ability to pray: 
 
O happy living things! no tongue 
Their beauty might declare: 
A spring of love gushed from my heart, 
And I blessed them unaware: 
Sure my kind saint took pity on me, 
    And I bless’d them unaware. 
 
The self-same moment I could pray; 
    And from my neck so free 
The Albatross fell off, and sank 
    Like lead into the sea. 
(PW I i 393-4, ll. 282-91) 
 
Blessing them “unaware” construes an act outside of the will. It is also mercurial, 
without a definitive explanation of which the Mariner is aware. Referring to Karl 
Friedrich Bahrdt’s Glaubens-Bekänntniss, and objecting to his Grotian theory of 
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redemption, Coleridge notes that “[s]in is a disease in the will. The will is a mystery[:] 
the Disease is a mystery: must we not therefore [e]xpect, that the Remedy should be a 
mystery?” (CM I 201) The mystery, Coleridge infers, is that of Christianity. The 
Mariner’s diseased will is remedied with his love and blessing toward the water-
snakes. Coleridge’s perspective of The Pilgrim’s Progress replicates this regeneration 
in his comment,  
 
in Bunyan’s judgement there must be at least a negative co-operation 
of the Will of Man with the Divine Grace––an energy of Non-
resistance to the workings of the Holy Spirit. But the error of the 
Calvinists is, that they divide the regenerate Will in Man from the 
Will of God––instead of including it. 
(CM I 820) 
 
The regeneration of the Mariner is due to the realignment of his will with the Absolute 
will, and inclusion with it. This does not occur in “The Wanderings of Cain”, in which 
a destiny beyond free-will has been allocated Cain, but one that he was once free to 
choose. 
The Lyrical Ballads were published early in Coleridge’s career and predate the 
influence of German Idealism, which motivated his texts thereafter. The result of 
these philosophical endeavours is reassessed by Lucy Newlyn, who affirms that it is 
not Coleridge’s ability to write poetry that is lost, but “an assumption about how 
perception works, and how writing is related to it” (Newlyn, 1986, 60). Newlyn refers 
to what she terms the loss of perception, quoting Coleridge’s letter to Godwin: “I look 
at the Mountains only for the Curves of their outlines” (25 March 1801, CL II 714, 
Newlyn, 59). Coleridge did not lose his ability to write all types of poetry, but his 
imaginative force was lost. Here the result of his “abstruse researches” is a stifled 
imaginative ability, and due to this a loss of perception. Given the nature of 
Coleridge’s imagination poetry, the loss of imaginative force resulted in the loss of 
perception complementary to the imagination. The function of perception is vital to 
the production of the imagination poems, and with its loss, the imaginative ability is 
impaired. Coleridge considered the primary imagination “to be the living power and 
prime agent of all human perception” (BL I 304). His lost perception resulted from the 
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influence of German Idealism and his elevated exposure to philosophy between 1798 
and 1801. 
An old acquaintance: Coleridge, Chatterton and Wesley 
Coleridge’s theological examination of the will is found throughout his poetry. 
Written in 1790, “Monody on the Death of Chatterton” is an early success of 
Coleridge’s. Holmes argues that this poem reveals the early influence of Thomas 
Chatterton on Coleridge (Holmes, 2000, 17). Fairer indicates an even closer affinity, 
enhancing the influence with “[i]n the 1790s Coleridge’s poetic character was 
intriguingly bound up with that of Thomas Chatterton” (Fairer, 138). Chatterton’s 
poem “Apostate Will” alludes to Coleridge’s eagerness to examine the debate 
between the doctrine of Calvinism and the doctrine of free-will. This he enlivens 
through the character of the preacher, who has more to do with apostasy in his 
perspective of the will, than with the will itself. The poem contains constant irony in 
reference to the concept of the will and the standpoints of each of these doctrines on 
it. Chatterton personifies the “will” in his poem, and represents the pastor as such, 
who also symbolises the debate mentioned above.  
 
But, be his outward what it will, 
His heart was an apostate's still. 
He'd oft profess an hallow'd flame, 
And every where preach'd Wesley's name; 
(Gregory, 1803, 9, ll. 29-32) 
 
The phrase “preach’d Wesley’s name” is opposite to the Calvinistic obsession with 
predestination. The Wesley brothers had separated from Calvinistic Methodism, and 
had established their own non-Calvinistic Wesleyan Methodism. In this poem the 
character of Chatterton’s preacher is contextualised by this debate between Calvinism 
and the doctrine of free-will. The preacher cared for neither of these doctrines, but 
was content to adopt the one that was most convenient for him. In both contexts, this 
fault is the apostate preacher’s for his choice of subject. Chatterton concludes his 
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poem with reference to the pastor. The last words of the poem “And keeps it with 
dissembled grace” (Ibid. ll. 54) with which the apostate preacher keeps his renewed 
place with the Anglicans, alludes to the differing Anglican and Wesleyan perspectives 
on the will. It also deduces the preacher’s apostasy from both standpoints. 
Coleridge’s poem “The Devil’s Thoughts” replicates the hypocritical and 
apostatical stance of Chatterton’s poem “Apostate Will”. “The Devil’s Thoughts” 
refers to an array of moral and religious dilemmas and circumstances concerning a 
variety of religious and social types in English society. This 1799 poem by Coleridge 
has close affinities to “Apostate Will”: 
 
[XII] 
He met an old acquaintance 
   Just by the Methodist meeting; 
She held a consecrated flag, 
   And the Devil nods a greeting. 
 
[XIII] 
She tip’d him the wink, then frown’d and cri’d 
   Avaunt! my name’s ––––––––– 
And turn’d to Mr. ––––  –––– 
   And leer’d like a love-sick pigeon. 
(PW I i 565-6, ll. 45-452) 
 
These social types, similar to Hogarthian visual portrayals of society in a moral 
context, include moral and religious depictions. Chatterton’s influence is notably 
found here in the correlations of extensive religious hypocrisy. 
One abiding hope, one thought, one love: Coleridge’s infatuation with Sara 
Hutchinson 
Methodism influenced Romanticism in ways outside of the Calvinist and free-will 
debates. Methodism was a growing force in the eightenth century and gained strong 
religious and social influence. Frederick Gill maint s that Romanticism was infused 
by religious sentiment that predated it. Resulting from religious awakening, this 
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infusion Gill regards is a hidden source of literary recovery that stimulated emotions 
and sensibility (Gill, 1937, 15). This emotion and sensibility became characteristic of 
Romanticism. Gill asserts this with reference to Sir Leslie Stephen’s claim, about 
literary influence, that “Wesleyanism is the most important phenomenon of the 
eighteenth century” (16). These assertions by Stephen t at were later agreed by Gill 
imply that the Romantic poets derived influence from Wesleyanism. 
Paul Magnusson suggests that Coleridge’s conversation poems introduce the short 
blank verse poem into English. A notable Methodist and Romantic poet was William 
Cowper, whose blank verse poem “The Task” Magnusson ide tifies as the nearest 
model of blank verse to Coleridge’s conversation poems. Magnusson does however 
also acknowledge the influence of Collins, Gray and Bowles on Coleridge 
(Magnusson, 2002, 33-34). 
Three characteristics of Methodism that Gill states p rmeated Romanticism are its 
forms of speech, images of nature and concepts of personality (Gill, 16). Coleridge’s 
poem, “Love”, was provoked after he had met and become besotted with Sara 
Hutchinson. This occurred on November 26, 1799, and he wrote the poem the next 
day (CM I xliii, Mays, 2002, 89). It opens with the stanza, 
 
All thoughts, all passions, all delights, 
Whatever stirs this mortal frame, 
All are but ministers of Love, 
      And feed his sacred flame. 
(PW I ii 606, ll. 1-4) 
 
This stanza correlates with the first stanza of Charles Wesley’s hymn, the first line 
amounting to the title, 
 
Blest be the dear uniting love 
    That will not let us part; 
Our bodies may far off remove, 
    We still are one in heart. 
(The Methodist Hymn-Book, 1933, pp. 273, # 712) 
 
Correlations here are numerous, but most prominently Coleridge borrows from 
Wesley’s hymn the concept of the mystical union of saints and unity of all believers. 
He superimposes this concept onto his new obsession w th Sara Hutchinson in 
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“Love”. Structurally they are similar, with syllabic counts differing only in the second 
line. 
Years later, his affection for her is unabated. Coleridge recorded his thoughts about 
her while on Malta, in a notebook entry whilst refering to what Raysor construes as 
his enforced absence (Raysor, 1929, 311): 
 
Long years of seriousness, of deep Passion, awful incidents, seas 
traversed, and the famous Things of the world seen, and all 
connected with the one abiding Hope, one Thought, one Love––
this will surely give a delicacy, an awe/a fear of saying <or doing> 
light or coarse Things in her Presence/& lengthen on the Passion 
by still combining it with a manly Feeling. 
(17 April 1804, CN II 2019) 
 
His obsession with Sara Hutchinson caused him to elevate her to an ethical measure, 
in “fear of saying or doing light or coarse Things”. 
The forms of speech, images of nature and concepts of personality that Methodist 
hymnology and Romanticism share, include other thematic similarities. Elemental 
correlations exist in the subject matter, prominently in the depictions of space and 
astronomical bodies, and remoteness and distant geographical regions and landscapes. 
From Methodism the references following acknowledge these elements, and include 
borrowings from Cartesian philosophy; Henry Francis Lyte describes “Dwellers all in 
time and space,” (The Methodist Hymn Book, pp. 5, # 12, ll. 22), and Charles Wesley 
states, “Meet and right it is to sing,//In every time and place,” (Ibid. pp. 6, # 17, ll. 1-
2). 
Methodism was emphasising the accepted order of the universe in these references, 
whereas Coleridge, despite using similar elements, dealt occasionally with them in 
their chaotic state, such as the plight of the Mariner. The awareness of the universe in 
the Romantic period predates Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species. The theories of 
space and geological time were not as developed then, as they later became in 
Darwinian Theory. 
Gill mentions characteristics that both Methodism and Romanticism shared, that 
they are both cosmic in range and meaning, and haveencyclopaedic tendencies (Gill, 
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19). The subject matter of eighteenth century hymnology was not limited to biblical 
themes, but was universal, and incorporated the geographic and astronomical. 
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Chapter 3 
This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist: the influences of the 1790s 
Several factors affected Coleridge in the 1790s and influenced the development and 
loss of the imagination poetry between 1797 and 1798. These factors include his 
marriage to Sara Fricker, abandonment of pantisocracy, first meeting and ensuing 
friendship with William Wordsworth, shift from radical politics to conservative 
politics, deprecating comments about his imaginatio p etry from Wordsworth and 
Robert Southey, opium use, and meeting Sara Hutchinson. 
Coleridge changed from his earlier radicalism to conservatism in the mid-1790s. 
Indicators of this change to conservative politics were evident with his work as a 
journalist for the Courier, at the end of the 1790s. In this publication his writings on 
the war with France saw him, as Kelvin Everest recognises, becoming “emphatically 
pro-government, alienating some among the dwindling band of his admirers” 
(Everest, 2002, 25). 
Coleridge’s political focus intensified in the early 1790s, when he first encountered 
Wordsworth’s Descriptive Sketches in 1793, and already his primary enthusiasm was 
for politics (Newlyn, 1986, 4). The politics Coleridge favoured was radical, and he 
approved of the political upheaval in France prior to 1796, but his disillusionment 
with radical politics grew and his political standpoint changes in 1796. His thoughts 
about developing circumstances in France arise in his letters, in which he expresses 
his changed outlook. To Benjamin Fowler he writes, in 1796,  
 
I seldom see any paper. Indeed I am out of heart with the French. In 
one of the numbers of my Watchman I wrote ‘a remonstra ce to the 
French Legislators’: it contain’d my politics; & the splendid victories 
of the French since that time have produced no alteration in them. I 
am tired of reading butcheries; and, altho’ I should be unworthy the 
name of man, if I did not feel my Head & Heart awfully interested in 
the final Event, yet, I confess, my Curiosity is worn ut with regard to 
the particulars of the Process. 
(11 December 1796, CL I 268-9)  
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Coleridge further reinforces his drift away from radical politics in a letter to John 
Prior Estlin in 1797, about the relationship between politics and religion: 
 
––and I am wearied with politics, even to soreness.––I never knew a 
passion for politics exist for a long time without it swallowing up, or 
absolutely excluding, a passion for Religion––. 
(23 July 1797, CL I 338) 
 
These comments mark an important change in Coleridg’s political perspective that 
occurs while his philosophical outlook is still primarily empirical, prior to Germany. 
These political opinions Coleridge wrote immediately before he began his poetry of 
imagination. Initially, Coleridge had approached revolutionary politics with 
enthusiasm, along with Southey and Wordsworth, but he abandoned it, stating, in a 
letter to his brother in 1798, “I have snapped my squeaking baby-trumpet of Sedition, 
& the fragments lie scattered in the lumber-room of Penitence” (CL I 397). 
Alfred Cobban makes the worthwhile point that following Coleridge’s turn from 
radical politics he went on to study “German metaphysics”, from whom Cobban 
argues that Coleridge was one of the first thinkers (in the English-speaking world) to 
recognise the significance of German Idealism (Cobban, 160). Cobban is not specific 
about the particular time that these changes occur. Nevertheless Coleridge’s 
abandonment of radical politics did occur prior to and during the time that he wrote 
his poems of imagination. 
This change in Coleridge’s political opinions is reiterated by the political and 
military turmoil occurring in Europe and the constant threat of a French invasion. 
Between October 1797 and May 1798 Napoleon’s army was encamped along the 
Channel coast (Fairer, 286, 286n), and England was con tantly under threat from a 
French invasion. Coleridge wrote the initial versions of the imagination poems, and 
several conversation poems that allude to these political conditions and military 
threat. Yet these tense circumstances did not dampen his imaginative force. 
Lesa Corrigan considers that the early Romantics anticipated “apocalyptic and 
millennial transformations” in politics and society, but the repercussions of the French 
Revolution destroyed this vision. These circumstances give way to large-scale 
industrialisation that reduced the rural existence that had preceded the Revolution 
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(Corrigan, 7). Consequently a new disillusioning factor exists in the aftermath of these 
events, unanticipated by those who upheld them. 
Coleridge moved to Nether Stowey in 1797 and settled where he would soon write 
the poems of heightened imagination. Richard Holmes refers to Coleridge’s move as 
“a deliberate rejection of any conventional career in literature or journalism” (Holmes, 
1989, 135). About his move to Nether Stowey Coleridge commented, “I say plainly, 
that literature was not a profession by which I could expect to live” (BL I 121, 
Holmes, 135). Under these circumstances his letter to John Thelwall states his need 
for employment: “I have neither money nor influence––& I suppose, that at last I 
must become a Unitarian minister as a less evil than st rvation––for I get nothing by 
literature” (14 October 1797, CL I 349). This letter was contemporaneous with the 
“Rime” and “Kubla Khan”, and was written while he endeavoured to write poems for 
the Lyrical Ballads. Nevertheless his financial circumstances led him away from 
literature as a form of employment. 
A characteristic of Coleridge’s conversation poems is that they contain 
biographical and autobiographical content. Coleridge experienced several changes in 
the latter half of 1795, when he wrote the first conversation poem, “The Eolian Harp”. 
There was upheaval for him due to his arguments with Robert Southey, and in 
conjunction with this he abandoned pantisocracy. Shortly thereafter Coleridge met 
Wordsworth, and on 4 October, Coleridge married Sara Fricker, to whom he had been 
engaged since August the previous year.  
The first two conversation poems predate the imaginatio  poetry, and the second to 
last, “Dejection: An Ode”, laments its loss. Their themes and content indicate the 
thoughts and directions of Coleridge at specific moments during the development 
leading to the imagination poetry and, following this, its apex and decline. There is 
evidence in “The Eolian Harp” and “Reflections on having left a Place of Retirement” 
that he and Sara2 discussed religion and philosophy. 
In “The Eolian Harp”, dated 1795, Coleridge portrays adjustments he made to his 
religious and philosophical interests. This poem is addressed to Sara Fricker, and in it 
                                                      
2 Conscious as I am of the feminist objection to the us  of first names for women, when men are 
denoted by their surnames, for the sake of mimetic stimulus, I will maintain this convention. Such 
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Coleridge relinquishes his philosophical inquiries, and agrees with her disapproval of 
them. This poem follows the influence of his future wife on his interest in these 
enquiries. In Coleridge’s reference to this, he provides an insight into the subjects that 
they spoke about and that concerned them both. 
 
    But thy more serious eye a mild reproof 
Darts, O beloved woman! nor such thoughts 
Dim and unhallowed dost thou not reject, 
And biddest me walk humbly with my God. 
Meek Daughter in the family of Christ! 
Well hast thou said and holily dispraised 
These shapings of the unregenerate mind; 
Bubbles that glitter as they rise and break 
On vain Philosophy's aye-babbling spring. 
For never guiltless may I speak of him, 
The Incomprehensible! save when with awe 
I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels; 
Who with his saving mercies healed me, 
A sinful and most miserable Man, 
Wildered and dark, and gave me to possess 
Peace, and this Cot, and thee, heart-honour'd Maid! 
(PW I i 234, ll. 49-64) 
 
This stanza refers to Sara’s influence on Coleridge, concerning his philosophical 
move away from certain types of thinking, because she persuades him to do so. This 
passage is his reply to her about conversations that they had about philosophy. She 
accordingly has influence on his primary interests, and disapproves of some, such as 
the philosophy in question, as indicated by the “mild reproof” of her eye. She also 
encourages other interests of his, such as religion. In this passage, he agrees with his 
wife to be, and refers to “vain Philosophy's aye-babbling spring.” His message to her 
in this poem is that he intends, henceforward, to dispense with this type of study. For 
this reason this poem acknowledges an agreement between them, which results from 
their conversations.  
 Coleridge wrote “The Eolian Harp” soon after he and Southey abandoned 
pantisocracy. The engagement of Coleridge to Sara, in August 1794, had until that 
time existed with the intention of emigration to the Susquehanna valley in 
                                                                                                                                                       
conventions were deeply ambiguated by Coleridge, who himself designates his wife as Sara and Mrs 
Coleridge. 
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Pennsylvania, with the intention of establishing a pantisocratic political and social 
system there. This political and philosophical context to their engagement was now 
over. Pantisocracy had a strong philosophical emphasis that Sara had become 
disillusioned with, along with her sister Edith, who ad recently married Southey.3 
Southey and Coleridge had been obsessed with this political and social system, and 
this may have alarmed Sara. She thus condemned this type of study and the politics 
associated with pantisocracy. Therefore, his future wif  may have been indifferent to 
philosophy when she first was engaged to Coleridge, but this changed as she learned 
more about this political and sociological system. Hence the philosophy in question, 
of which Sara disapproved, was that in which pantisocracy was involved. However, 
this disapproval did not extend to Coleridge’s enthusiasm for the doctrines of Hartley 
and Berkeley. Coleridge abandoned this political system due to Southey’s 
abandonment of it, and not for philosophical reasons. 
The conversation poems of the 1790s predate Coleridge’s adoption of German 
Idealism, but postdate his pantisocratic ambition. He wrote the imagination poems in 
the later part of this same timeframe. Both types of poem consequently fall within this 
same period of philosophical study, which turned away from pantisocracy and 
focussed primarily on empiricism. 
Coleridge repeats his claim that he has turned away from the philosophy 
mentioned in “The Eolian Harp”. In “Reflections on Having Left a Place of 
Retirement” he reasserts this in the context of honourable toil; 
 
I therefore go, and join head, heart, and hand, 
Active and firm, to fight the bloodless fight 
Of Science, Freedom, and the Truth in CHRIST. 
(PW I i 263, ll. 60-62) 
 
Sara’s involvement in Coleridge’s interests at this time should not be construed as 
harmful. Her intrusion diverted him toward a heightened focus on the empirical 
doctrines of Hartley and Berkeley. It was during the ime of this empirical focus, and 
accordingly under its influence, that Coleridge wrote the poems of imagination. 
Coleridge’s ability to write the poems of heightened imagination at this time, 
                                                      
3 Sara’s rejection of philosophy is conjecture on my part, but Holmes’s and Sisman’s treatment of her 
comments about Coleridge’s politics lightly suggest her disapproval of this subject. 
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demonstrates that were complemented by the doctrines of Hartley and Berkeley, but 
these poems were antithetical to the philosophical project Coleridge took up in 
Göttingen. 
As a result and despite her interference, Coleridge’s wife inadvertently sent him 
more specifically in the direction of the empiricism that complemented the 
imagination poems. Due to this freedom his imaginative force progressed unhindered. 
This poetic ability Coleridge later unknowingly ousted using the “unwholesome 
quicksilver mines of mataphysic” that he blames for his loss of imagination in 
“Dejection: An Ode”. Hence he wrote the poems of imagination whilst mostly 
focussed on the empiricism of Hartley and Berkeley, and once distanced from 
pantisocracy and prior to commencing with German Idealism. 
The brief time-span he took to write the imagination poems is that which he spent 
primarily in studying empiricism. Coleridge acknowledges his loss of imaginative 
force as the result of his studies in German Idealism. However, he does not mention if 
his earlier imaginative force was the result of his particular philosophical foci at that 
time, primarily the empirical focus and the circumstances that led him to it. 
A later reference concerning philosophy and politics is found in a letter written the 
following year, on 11 December 1796, to the bereaved B njamin Fowler. This letter 
reveals Coleridge’s perspective of philosophy relative o religion at this time, the year 
before beginning the poems of imagination: 
 
I have been myself sorely afflicted, and have rolled my dreary eye 
from earth to Heaven, and found no comfort, till it pleased the 
Unimaginable High & Lofty One to make my Heart more tender in 
regard of religious feelings. My philosophical refinements, & 
metaphysical theories, lay by me in the hour of anguish, as toys by the 
bedside of a child deadly sick. 
(CL I 267, Graham, 530) 
 
This sentiment indicates that his philosophical inclinations had not altered his 
religious position. He repeats here his emphasis on faith, found in the first two 
conversation poems, and his abandonment of certain philosophical theories. 
His wife’s influence is lost in late 1798, when Coleridge leaves for Germany, and 
this correlates with his loss of imagination. He never again falls as closely under her 
influence, even after his return to England in 1799. After his return, they were 
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increasingly at variance, and his declining health nd growing addiction to opium, led 
to his long spell abroad, chiefly spent on Malta. Thereafter, in England, Coleridge 
chiefly spent his life estranged from his wife. 
In the first two conversation poems, written in Sara’s presence, Coleridge 
harmoniously describes the agreements about philosophy between them. They contain 
no bitterness or resentment about abandoning the study that they concern. Coleridge 
included, in several letters, his later judgment of Sara’s influence on him. To Southey 
he wrote, 
 
In an evil Day for me did I first pay attention to Mrs Coleridge; in an 
evil day for me did I marry her; but it shall be my care & my passion, 
that it shall not be an evil day for her 
(17 February 1803, CL II 929) 
 
He regrets what their marriage did to his literary nd philosophical interests, but he 
did not target his resentment at Sara. Southey influe ced the engagement of Coleridge 
to Sara for the purposes of pantisocracy, and further persuaded Coleridge to marry her 
after they had abandoned this political and social system. Anya Taylor considers 
Coleridge’s marriage to Sara Fricker as the fulfilment of Southey’s duty to her, as 
Southey was a close childhood friend of Sara who, in marrying her sister, he 
neglected to marry Sara herself (Taylor, 2005, 23).Thus, Coleridge directed his anger 
about his marriage to Mrs Coleridge at Southey, not her. He had primarily adored 
Mary Evans, to whom he wrote on hearing of her engagement in early November 
1794 (CL I 129-31). This he did despite his own existing enagement to Sara Fricker. 
Returning to the 1803 letter, Coleridge asks Southey never to mention the letter to 
Mrs. Southey [Edith], and adds,  
 
Good heaven! what a shocking Thing that there should be such 
unnecessary canker-worms in your Happiness! You only need a little 
courage to give a little pain. You are happy in your marriage Life; & 
greatly to the honour of your moral self-government, Qualities & 
manners are pleasant to, & sufficient for, you, to which my Nature is 
utterly unsuited. 
(CL II 929) 
 
This statement is ironic. Southey understands the context well, and Coleridge implies 
that Southey obtained the “Happiness” he enjoys selfishly, at his expense. This 
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expense was his marriage to Sara, and accordingly it is also at Sara’s expense. 
Coleridge’s reference to Southey’s “moralities” and “manners” implies their opposite, 
that Southey’s coercive measures to have Coleridge and Sara married in 1795 were 
immoral. Coleridge’s request, that Southey never mention this letter to Edith, is 
further irony. It occurs early in the letter, and Coleridge adds that not speaking about 
it to Edith may be converse to Southey’s “marriage-code”. It is ironic, as Southey 
never could mention the content of the letter to Edith. This is because Southey would 
then have to explain his complicity in influencing the marriage between Coleridge and 
Sara, something of which neither Sara nor Edith were fully aware. It follows that 
Southey’s “moral self” was lacking and could not retreat to a place of security. 
This letter consequently refers to circumstances in which Southey had been 
involved in 1795. These led to the situation in which the conversation poems, and 
later the imagination poems, were written. In an earli r letter that Coleridge wrote to 
Southey, in July 1802, he asserts how different he and Sara are from one another, 
 
––for Mrs Coleridge's mind has very little that is bad in it––it is an 
innocent mind––; but it is light, and unimpressible, warm in anger, 
cold in sympathy––and in all disputes uniformly projects itself forth to 
recriminate, instead of turning itself inward with a silent Self-
questioning. Our virtues & our vices are exact antitheses––. 
(29 July 1802, CL II 832) 
 
By contrast Coleridge sent Sara Hutchinson a version of “Dejection: An Ode”, earlier 
that year, on 4 April 1802 (CL II 790). In it Coleridge represents to her the issues 
surrounding his loss of imagination, and refers to earlier times in his poetry. Newlyn 
states that his “past and present selves are invoked, contrasted, used to pinpoint 
change”, and via this focus she examines his relationship to his former self (Newlyn, 
1986, 61). This letter to Sara Hutchinson indicates that Coleridge knew her closely 
enough that he judged she would understand the personal and literary implications of 
his poem. This requires that Sara Hutchinson’s understanding of Coleridge’s literary 
interests extend beyond any understanding Sara Fricker possessed of his interests, and 
that Sara Hutchinson’s knowledge of Coleridge was intimate. 
Of the conversation poems, the last two have several ch racteristics that differ 
from the others. “Dejection: An Ode”, written in 1802, mourns the loss of 
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imagination, amongst several other factors, such as is marriage. In 1807, he wrote 
“To William Wordsworth”, in which Coleridge comments on past circumstances in 
relation to their present. Lamenting his loss of imagination, Coleridge poetically 
consolidated his thoughts about this loss in “Dejection: An Ode”. It was published on 
the day of Wordsworth’s marriage to Mary Hutchinson in 1802, and Coleridge’s own 
wedding anniversary (Ashton, 1996, 201). 
 
     II 
 
A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear,  
   A stifled, drowsy, unimpassion’d grief, 
   Which finds no natural outlet, no relief,  
          In word, or sigh, or tear—  
(PW I ii 698, ll. 21-24) 
 
Those stars, that glide behind them or between, 
Now sparkling, now bedimm’d, but always seen; 
 
Yon crescent Moon, as fix’d as if it grew 
In its own cloudless, starless lake of blue; 
I see them all so excellently fair, 
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are! 
(PW I ii 698-9, ll. 33-38) 
 
This last line is a reminder of his words, “I look at the Mountains only for the Curves 
of their outlines” (25 March 1801, CL II 714), quoted through Newlyn earlier. This 
loss of “feeling” is part of Coleridge’s imaginative perception that is lost. His 
perception is diminished and with it he has lost his poetic ability and imaginative 
force, to induce the “reliques of sensation” from their mercurial formlessness. 
In its entirety the sixth section of “Dejection: An Ode” forms a concise 
autobiographical elucidation of his loss of imagination; this is quoted earlier, in the 
introduction, and therefore referenced only in part here. 
 
       But oh! each visitation 
Suspends what nature gave me at my birth, 
    My shaping spirit of Imagination. 
For not to think of what I needs must feel, 
    But to be still and patient, all I can; 
And haply by abstruse research to steal 
    From my own nature all the natural man-- 
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    This was my sole resource, my only plan: 
Till that which suits a part infects the whole, 
And now is almost grown the habit of my soul. 
(PW I ii 700, ll. 84-93) 
 
Coleridge identified that his loss of imagination was due to his “abstruse researches”. 
Despite this knowledge, he did not relinquish his study of German Idealism as an 
attempt to regain his imaginative force. The “abstruse researches” have an ironic 
grasp on him. He recognises that they prevent him fro  gaining his imaginative force, 
because once chosen this philosophy had grown into “the habit of [his] soul”. 
Coleridge implies here that he has a choice between imagination and German 
Idealism. But they are mutually exclusive. Choosing magination requires him to 
abandon German Idealism, and continuing with this plosophy renders him incapable 
of writing imaginative poetry. Thus, he chose German Idealism. 
The Mariner and Christabel lose their volition as their narratives progress. 
Similarly, Coleridge loses his volition to write imagination poetry as his attention to 
German Idealism progresses. In “Dejection: An Ode”, h  refers to his circumstance of 
imagination loss: 
 
Hence, viper thoughts, that coil around my mind, 
            Reality's dark dream! 
I turn from you, and listen to the wind, 
    Which long has rav’d unnoticed. What a scream 
Of agony by torture lengthen’d out 
That lute sent forth! 
(Ibid. ll. 94-99) 
 
This poem is not entirely retrospective of imagination poetry, but here Coleridge 
attempts imaginative poetry, although unsuccessfully. His last successful imaginative 
poem suggests this loss, in “Christabel” Part II. As nya Taylor points out, 
Christabel’s will is silenced when Geraldine assumes power, a shift revealed in lines 
305-6: “O Geraldine! One hour was thine––//Thou’st had thy will!” (PW I i 492, 
Taylor). Coleridge comments about Geraldine’s actions, and in so doing recalls the 
“hour” of his own imagination now lost, although temporarily revived to complete 
Part II. The reference is more pertinent considering it is the last of Coleridge’s 
imagination poems, and the only section written after Germany. Because of his 
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obsession with imagination, and his stronger philosophical leaning, Coleridge merged 
these two fields in certain chapters of the Biographia, using the latter to explain the 
former. 
In “Dejection: An Ode” the origin of his imaginative power is mystically portrayed 
in section five, and is granted according to conditions of virtue: 
 
This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist, 
This beautiful, and beauty-making power. 
   Joy, virtuous Lady! Joy that ne'er was given, 
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour, 
Life, and Life's Effluence, Cloud at once and Shower, 
(PW I ii 699, ll. 62-66) 
 
 
Equivalent moods occur in Methodist hymnology, as in stanza two of Charles 
Wesley’s “Christ, Whose glory fills the skies”: 
 
Dark and cheerless is the morn 
   Unaccompanied by Thee; 
Joyless is the day’s return, 
   Till Thy mercy’s beams I see; 
Till they inward light impart, 
Glad my eyes, and warm my heart. 
(The Methodist Hymn-Book, pp. 353, ll. 7-12) 
Genius given, and knowledge won in vain: further discouragements 
Familial estrangement now was underway, never to be resolved, but more 
importantly, and compounding this, opium took a stronger hold upon Coleridge than it 
had ever before. Such was its influence that four years on from “Dejection: An Ode”, 
his ode “To William Wordsworth” describes a state more diminished than before: 
 
And even as Life returns upon the drowned, 
Life's joy rekindling roused a throng of pains--- 
Keen pangs of Love, awakening as a babe 
Turbulent, with an outcry in the heart; 
And fears self-willed, that shunned the eye of Hope; 
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And Hope that scarce would know itself from Fear; 
Sense of past Youth, and Manhood come in vain, 
And Genius given, and Knowledge won in vain; 
And all which I had culled in wood-walks wild, 
And all which patient toil had reared, and all, 
Commune with thee had opened out--but flowers 
Strewed on my corse, and borne upon my bier, 
In the same coffin, for the self-same grave! 
 
(PW I ii 818, ll. 63-75) 
 
Throughout the time that Coleridge wrote the imagintion poems he occasionally took 
opium, hence the now famous origin of “Kubla Khan”. Coleridge required doses of 
opium as a painkiller, but he became addicted to it, which he called a “habit”. This is 
one of the factors that alienated him from his family in the early nineteenth century. In 
a letter to Southey, Coleridge describes his opium addiction: 
 
My only medicine is an universal & regular Stimulus––Brandy, 
Laudanum &c &c make me well, during their first operation; but the 
secondary Effects increase the cause of the Disease. 
(17 February 1803, CL II 930)  
 
In a marginal note on Emanuel Swedenborg’s De coelo et inferno, Coleridge 
commented on what Swedenborg called “reigning love” and claimed he did “not 
distinctly understand” this notion but compared it to his own prevailing problem with 
opium. He responds, 
 
But this I feel with tremendous depth, that for a man enthralled in any 
habit condemned by himself, and bitterly bitterly incessantly groaned 
over––exempli gratiâ, the ruinous use of anodynes & opiates, which 
he loathes while he takes, yet still takes, goaded on by pain, and more 
than pain, and by the dread of both––that for such a man, I say, this 
chapter is of unspeakable Horror. 
(CM IV 419) 
 
The depredation in question he does not openly reveal, but he alludes to opium and 
describes more clearly its “ruinous” effects on him. He remembers, in several of his 
letters, long-suffering friends who tolerated him while he dealt with this “habit”. This 
eventually leads to his stay on Malta, beginning in 1804, although it is questionable 
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whether his stay on this island was primarily intend d for opium recovery or to work 
for the British government.  
Newlyn considers Coleridge to have been weak in personality, evidenced, 
according to her, by his propensity to write to suit his audience (Newlyn, 2002, 7). 
Patronisation of his audience, as she implies, is a highly unconvincing claim. As a 
singular example, the risk involved in his primary contribution to the Lyrical Ballads, 
namely the “Rime”, is considerable. Owing to the exp rimental nature of the Lyrical 
Ballads in general, and the “Rime” in particular, it has several characteristics that 
were unique and new on the first publication of theLyrical Ballads. Due to these 
factors at the time of publication, there was no guarantee of a pleasing audience 
response, and the experimental content of the Lyrical Ballads was not a safe way to 
acquire an appropriate response, with more secure altern tives available. Coleridge 
refers, with revulsion, to occasions when he did write for the popular audience. He 
recalls to Thomas Poole, 
 
I cannot express to you, dear Friend of my heart!––the loathing, which 
I once or twice felt, when I attempted to write, merely for the 
Bookseller without any sense of the moral utility of what I was 
writing. 
(16 March 1801, CL II 707) 
 
This same position against the popular audience also holds true for the new criticism 
later espoused by Coleridge and Hazlitt. Coleridge took this to the extent that in the 
Biographia he insulted certain echelons of his readers, who fall into particular 
categories of readership and theology. In this regard, despite his awareness of market 
forces, he did not forfeit his focus on the importance of a subject for the sake of 
popularity or “property” and therefore ownership and economics. The readership for 
the Romantic poets also represented market-forces. Byron alludes to this in stanza six 
of the “Dedication” of Don Juan, and describes his attitude to Coleridge and 
Wordsworth: 
 
I would not imitate the petty thought, 
      Nor coin my self-love to so base a vice, 
For all the glory your conversion brought, 
      Since gold alone should not have been its price. 
You have your salary; was’t for that you wrought? 
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      And Wordsworth has his place in the Excise. 
You’re shabby fellows––true––but poets still, 
And duly seated on the immortal hill. 
(Steffan, 1971, 12, lines 42-49) 
 
Byron wrote and published his own poetry in the apparent security of social credit 
despite being bankrupt, and he traded on his social position and became wealthy from 
his poems. In the “Dedication” he queries the motives of Coleridge and Wordsworth, 
implying that their literary intention is to please the market-forces of the day, and as a 
result to earn an income. Accordingly Newlyn agrees with Byron that Coleridge wrote 
to suit his audience. Coleridge however doubted the ability of the mass-audience to 
understand literature. He was not merely concerned about his readers’ reception of his 
literature for the sake of his own finances, but he laboured to reform the reader to 
perceive and discern works of genius from ordinary writing. In the Biographia 
Coleridge disapproves unapologetically of idle readers. Criticising readers in his 
reference to new types of easily comprehended poetry, he states that 
 
it spares the reader the trouble of thinking; prevents vacancy, while 
it indulges indolence; and secures the memory from all danger of 
an intellectual plethora. Hence of all trades, litera ure at present 
demands the least talent or information; and, of all modes of 
literature, the manufacturing of poems. The difference indeed 
between these and the works of genius, is not less than between an 
egg, and an egg-shell; yet at a distance they both lo k alike. 
(BL I 39) 
 
There is continuity between this criticism in the Biographia and his poetry of 
imagination, as Coleridge does not flatter his audience in either of them. In this quote 
Coleridge is concerned about the critical ability that his readers and all other readers 
in general possess to read poetry. 
The range of styles in which Coleridge wrote his poems is vast. His variety of 
subject matter and volume of work in other areas, such as philosophy, religion and 
politics, demonstrate his genius. Coleridge’s shift to German Idealism that leads to his 
loss of imaginative force, may likewise be misconstrued as an attempt to tap into 
alternative literary markets, and attract a wider and more diverse readership. 
However, in many of these texts he deals with ethical and religious topics that 
contradict the type of personality weaknesses about which Newlyn speaks. The idea 
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that Coleridge had an inordinate longing to be liked is Newlyn’s interpretation of his 
literary range, which she suggests explains his “experimentation” with so many 
methods of communication (Newlyn, 2002, 7). This fals to explain why several of his 
texts accuse his readers of inadequacy instead of flattering them, or why he ignored 
the financial safety of convention to write experimental poetry. His literary range and 
experimentation is better discerned as the result of a search for philosophical, 
sociological, political, epistemological and religious knowledge, and to deepen his 
universal interests. Coleridge also focussed on exploring muddles, and this activity 
also contained an experimental element, as he developed associations between 
concepts. Many of these concepts were vague and difficult to discern. His comment to 
John Thelwall on 19 November 1796 suggests the topics and focus of these muddles; 
“Metaphysics and Poetry and ‘Facts of mind,’ … are my darling studies” (CL I 260). 
Furthermore, Newlyn bolsters her contention for Coleridge’s weakness with 
reference to his opium addiction, and his assumed obsessive-compulsive condition 
and self-consciousness (7). Self-consciousness in Coleridge’s case was, of necessity, 
unique considering he trod new pathes in literary representations of the self, the I, 
consciousness, the will, and perception. This literary territory necessitated meticulous 
self-scrutiny that might be misconstrued as weakness or elf-consciousness. 
Coleridge’s modesty about his poetic and literary ability is notable, and his 
comments about his ability allude to this. To Joseph Cottle he writes, “I have heard 
from Sheridan, desiring me to write a Tragedy–––I have no genius that way––Robert 
Southey has” (10 March 1797, CL I 313). Later that year in June he stated of his 
tragedy Osorio,  
 
Wordsworth admires my Tragedy––which gives me great hopes. 
Wordsworth has written a Tragedy himself. I speak with heart-felt 
sincerity & (I think) unblinded judgement, when I tell you, that I feel 
myself a little man by his side; & yet do not think myself the less man, 
than I formerly thought myself… 
 
T. Poole’s opinion of Wordsworth is––that he is thegr atest Man, he 
ever knew––I coincide. 
(8 June 1797, CL I 325) 
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Coleridge repeats in several letters the acclamation, “Wordsworth is a great man” 
(Ibid. 334). It was not only German Idealism that changed Coleridge’s literary 
trajectory; so too did Wordsworth’s discouragement. Coleridge’s comments about 
Wordsworth complemented and praised him regularly. Wordsworth, by comparison, 
occasionally maligned Coleridge’s poetry. Wordsworth was reluctant to include 
“Christabel” in the second edition of the Lyrical Ballads in 1800, even if complete. 
About this Coleridge reasoned to Humphrey Davy, that  
 
the poem was in direct opposition to the very purpose for which the 
Lyrical Ballads were published––viz––an experiment to see how far 
those passions, which alone give value to extraordina y Incidents, 
were capable of interesting, in & for themselves, in the incidents of 
common Life. 
(9 October 1800, CL I 631) 
 
John Jordan recognises that this appears more like Wordsworth’s preface to the 
second edition of the Lyrical Ballads than Coleridge’s own opinion (Jordan, 1976, 
13). Coleridge emphasised this disparity further in a letter, written from Keswick, to 
Josiah Wedgwood several weeks later. He refers to undertaking to finish “Christabel” 
on his return from Germany the previous year, and in the context of regaining his 
imaginative force, describes hoe, 
 
The next day, my verse making faculties returned to me, and I 
proceeded successfully––till my poem grew so long & in 
Wordsworth’s opinion so impressive, that he rejected it from his 
volume as disproportionate both in size & merit, & as discordant in its 
character. 
(1 November 1800, CL I 643) 
 
Unfinished poems of imagination, which Coleridge had written by this time, awaited 
publication for almost two decades. These later publications are for this reason 
characteristic of his mind and poetry at this time, changes permitting. “Christabel” is 
one such example: Part I he wrote in 1797, and Part II he completed in 1800-1. He 
had intended to publish it in 1801, anticipating that “I shall therefore take a Week’s 
respite; & make Christabel ready for the Press” (16 March 1801, CL II 707). The 
publication date, for its incomplete state, is 1816, for the first two of five prospective 
parts. 
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Thus, the narrative of “Christabel” Part II stems from this time and is 
chronologically isolated from the other poems of imagination. It is unclear and cannot 
be established what the latest date of Coleridge’s imaginative force was. J. C. C. Mays 
proposes that Coleridge’s progress with “Christabel” was irregular, ranging between 
1797 and 1801 (PW I i 478). “Christabel” Part II however does not indicate newly 
generated imaginative content by Coleridge following his return to England. It rather 
demonstrates that he wrote Part II primarily from memory. His reason for ceasing to 
write “Christabel” he clarifies, over a decade later, in a notebook reference (3 
November 1810, CN III 4006). In this reference Coleridge recollects that he 
abandoned “Christabel” in its incomplete form because he quarrelled with Lamb and 
Lloyd. This quarrel Coleridge also mentions in a letter of early May 1798 (CL I 403-
5). In the letter, he describes the quarrel as something that has given him “little pain”, 
yet the notebook entry reveals that it was enough of an upheaval for him that he 
ceased writing “Christabel”. 
With Part I of “Christabel” complete in 1798, his thoughts would naturally have 
extended to its further development, which he discus ed with others. Wordsworth and 
Southey read Part I. He communicated with Southey about it, and hence reiterated his 
intentions for the text. This he did to the point where it had sufficient structure and 
content to survive in his mind until penned in the last days of 1800. Adam Sisman 
observes that Southey encouraged Coleridge to complete “Christabel”, desiring it as 
the opening poem for an edition of the Annual Anthology, of which Southey was the 
editor in 1799 and 1800 (Sisman, 276). Wordsworth also commented on Part I of the 
“Christabel” text, although derisively (280). It foll ws that both Wordsworth and 
Southey read the text and gave their opinions of itto Coleridge. He wrote to Byron 
about “Christabel”, 
 
I should say that the plan of the whole poem was formed and the first 
Book and half of the second were finished-and it was not till after my 
return from Germany in the year 1800 that I resumed it and finished 
the second and a part of the third book.  
(22 October 1815, Griggs, 1930, 1091) 
 
The fragmentary reference to “a part of the third book” indicates where this planning 
of structure and content had ended years before and co sequently Coleridge’s 
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inability to write beyond that point. Influence to either complete or abandon it 
Coleridge received from close quarters. Nevertheless the initial loss of his imaginative 
ability he realised when he attempted to complete “Christabel”. 
Wordsworth’s comments about “Christabel” convey his attitude toward 
Coleridge’s poetry of imagination in general. Wordsworth’s admiration for 
“Christabel” softens his dismissal of Coleridge’s poetry behind a veil of approval. 
These comments by Wordsworth, Coleridge repeats in his own letters, and it appears 
that he did not repeat them for their ironic essence, but rather that he took them on 
trust. When Wordsworth classified “Christabel” as “disproportionate both in size & 
merit” he was reasserting their initial intention that they gave for the Lyrical Ballads 
in its introduction. He used these intentions to prtect and reserve its next edition 
primarily for his own poetry. Coleridge, however, accepted Wordsworth’s 
explanation, and even repeated it years later in the Biographia. Here he refers to their 
agreement that he would attend to “persons and chara ters supernatural, or at least 
romantic” in the context of human nature and the “semblance of truth”. He even refers 
to “Christabel” from this perspective (BL II 6). 
Such rejection may also contribute to Coleridge’s lack of poetical output at this 
time, and his reluctance to apply his perception to imagination poetry and, it follows, 
to complete “Christabel”. Emphasising this circumstance, Sisman implies that it may 
have caused Coleridge’s reduced poetic output. His reply to Southey’s appeal for a 
complete version of “Christabel” is that he was “not in a poetical Mood” (30 
September 1799, CL I 535, Sisman, 276) and that 
 
those who dislike it [“Christabel”] will deem it extravagant Ravings, 
& go on thro’ the rest of the Collection [Lyrical Ballads] with the 
feeling of Disgust – & it is not impossible that were it liked by any, it 
would still not harmonize with the real-life Poems that follow. 
(15 November 1799, CL I 540, Sisman, 276) 
 
The “real-life poems” were those of Wordsworth. Coleridge judged “Christabel” an 
inappropriate choice to open the collection, and Sisman considers this the result of 
Wordsworth’s influence, after dropping the “Rime” from the second edition of the 
Lyrical Ballads (Sisman, 274, 276). Southey had also ridiculed the “Rime” when he 
reviewed the Lyrical Ballads for its “single” “anonymous” author (272-3). 
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Coleridge’s refusal to finish “Christabel” at Southey’s request suggests his suspicion 
of Southey using this as a means of apology for his comments about the “Rime”. 
Coleridge may in fact have forseen that Southey didnot intend to publish 
“Christabel”, but was using the offer as a ploy to restore their friendship through 
flattery. Coleridge’s reply to Southey, quoted above, also provides an insight into his 
opinion of himself and his own poetry. Sisman refers to a letter dated 25 March 1799 
that Sara Coleridge wrote to Thomas Poole, noting that he Lyrical Ballads “are 
laughed at and disliked” (272), and that the ballad given primary derision was the 
“Rime”, which was Coleridge’s principal contribution to the edition. This gave 
Wordsworth further reason to resent Coleridge’s poetry. In 1799, Coleridge’s poetic 
productivity was vast, but this output dwindled in 1800. He wrote more poetry 
between 1796 and1800 than he wrote for the following 25 years. 
The most straightforward reason for this is his increasing attention to German 
Idealism from 1799 onwards. Despite his loss of imagin tion, Coleridge never 
stopped writing significant literary content, which is a testimony to his literary genius, 
range and insight. The sting of Wordsworth’s comment about Coleridge’s imagination 
poetry may also have been responsible for his reduced poetic output, and may also 
have given him a melancholic disposition toward imagin tion poetry. Social and 
relational circumstances also discouraged Coleridge from writing poetry of 
imaginative force, as is observed in his quarrel with Lamb and Lloyd, mentioned 
above, that halted the writing of “Christabel”.  
Wordsworth’s comments about Coleridge’s contributions to the first edition of the 
Lyrical Ballads indicate Wordsworth’s perception of and sensitivity to readership in 
the late 1790s. The content contributed by both poets was new, the reading public was 
unaccustomed to it, and the Lyrical Ballads were revolutionary in their poetic content, 
stepping out of the accepted poetic conventions of the 1790s in England. Coleridge’s 
Biographia on the other hand intends, as one of its numerous objectives, to correct 
and reform the reading public, and improve the focus of its reading. It therefore had 
an intended epistemological role that defines Coleridg ’s fascination with knowledge 
and philosophy. This he valued above regaining his imaginative force. 
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Chapter 4 
A ballad of about 300 lines: content for the Lyrical Ballads 
Coleridge spoke to Wordsworth, in the autumn of 1797, about the revival of the ballad 
form (Holmes, 1989, 169). In a letter of 20 November 1797, Coleridge attends to his 
progress translating the Oberon of Wieland. He also briefly mentions recently writing 
“a ballad of about 300 lines”, which was the “Rime” (CL I 357). Translating the 
Oberon also indicated his anticipation and determination o read and derive influence 
from German texts, and pre-empted his interest in German Idealism. 
Many of Coleridge’s poems, written between 1797 and 1798, he intended for 
mutual publication with Wordsworth’s poems in the Lyrical Ballads. Thus, the 
“Rime” was part of a collaborative process, begun by Coleridge on a walk with 
Wordsworth. 
In the introduction, it was mentioned that Coleridge’s imagination poems were 
inseparable from their context as prospective content for the first edition of the 
Lyrical Ballads. Along with this context is the poems inseparability from the ballad 
form and its characteristic narrative progression. This form of poetry was 
longstanding in English literature, and it was on this old ballad form that Coleridge 
and Wordsworth structured their poems for the Lyrical Ballads. Coleridge commented 
on the ballad form of poetry, in the context of everyday life, which was Wordsworth’s 
foundational theme in his contribution to the publicat on; 
 
In this form the “Lyrical Ballads” were published; and were presented 
by him, as an experiment, whether subjects, which from their nature 
rejected the usual ornaments and extra-colloquial style of poems in 
general, might not be so managed in the language of ordinary life as to 
produce the pleasurable interest, which it is the peculiar business of 
poetry to impart. 
(BL II 8) 
 
The generation of the “Rime” occurred at a significant time in maritime history for 
Britain and the world. The Cook voyages to latitudes further south than previously 
voyaged were key undertakings at this time. There is a l nk between Coleridge’s own 
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past and this history, as Tim Fulford elaborates. A school mathematics teacher of 
Coleridge’s, William Wales, had been the astronomer aboard the particular Cook 
voyage that reached the most southerly point attained at that time, in 1774. Cook 
voyaged beyond known limits and so does the Mariner (Fulford, 2002, 50). In 
particular Wales worked the chronometers to determine longitude, calculating that 
they crossed the Antarctic Circle three times searching for a south polar continent 
(CM I 615). The correlation here is an obvious but shallow one, namely the 
association between Coleridge and Wales. However, this does demonstrate that 
maritime characteristics appropriate to the “Rime” were at play in Coleridge’s mind 
from an early date, even though he did not anticipate what they would become in 
time. 
For some of the time that Coleridge wrote the “Rime” h  was concurrently writing 
his play Osorio. In October 1797 he referred to this play, and recited a lament by 
Alhadra, the persecuted Moorish woman (14 October 1797, CL I 351), 
 
It were a lot divine in some small Skiff 
Along some Ocean's boundless solitude, 
To float for ever with a careless course, 
And think myself the only Being alive! 
(PW III i 207, Act 5 Sc. i, ll. 55-8) 
 
This content asserts the intentions of Romanticism to explore the individual mind in 
relation to nature, introspection, solitude, isolate context, and the consciousness of 
self. “The Foster-mother’s Tale”, which J. C. C. Mays notes was originally part of 
Osorio (PW I i 329), concludes with the boy sailing off alone: 
 
In spite of his dissuasion, seized a boat, 
And, all alone, set sail by silent moonlight 
Up a great river, great as any sea, 
And ne’er was heard of more; 
(Ibid. 333, ll. 77-80) 
 
Coleridge wrote to John Thelwall at the same time as he worked on these other texts, 
about becoming a Unitarian minister for employment. I  this letter, Coleridge 
provides further insight into his intentions regarding Alhadra, and he also establishes 
how personally a comparable sensibility was present within himself. 
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I should much wish, like the Indian Vishnu, to float about along an 
infinite ocean cradled in the flower of the Lotus, and wake once in a 
million years for a few minutes just to know that I was going to sleep 
a million years more. I have put this feeling in the mouth of Alhadra, 
my Moorish Woman. She is going by moonlight to the ouse of 
Yelez, where the band turn off to wreak their vengeance on Francesco, 
but She moved steadily on, Unswerving from the path of er resolve. 
(14 October 1797, CL I 350) 
 
These lines from Osorio, “The foster-mother’s Tale”, and the letter to John Thelwall 
are distinctly similar to the Mariner’s suffering. Alhadra’s longing for solitude and 
isolation is the Mariner’s despair. The Mariner exclaims, in the 1798 version of the 
“Rime”, 
 
Alone, alone, all all alone, 
   Alone on a wide wide sea! 
And Christ would take no pity on 
   My soul in agony. 
(PW I i 390, ll. 232-5) 
 
These four references were all written within months of each other, in the second half 
of 1797 and the beginning of 1798. Consequently the same themes of Romanticism 
emerge in each reference, namely those of solitude an  the individual self in an isolate 
context. The introspection of the self occurs while it interacts with a perspective of a 
boundless world in solitude. However, the response to these characteristics expressed 
by Alhadra is opposite to that of the Mariner. She finds the prospect welcoming, 
whereas the Mariner’s reaction to it is despair. Accordingly Coleridge uses the same 
circumstance, but the Mariner and Alhadra have different reactions to it. 
These circumstances also emphasise personal identity. Fairer scrutinises the 
Lockean notion of personal identity, that “to be a ‘person’ is to be conscious of a self 
that persists through any number of temporal and spatial relocations: it ‘can consider 
it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places’” (Locke in 
Fairer, 35). A characteristic of Coleridge’s imaginat on poems, which predate his 
adoption of German Idealism, is the empirical notion of existence and identity. The 
inner thinking self of the Mariner continues despite the changes in the Cartesian 
components of time and space. There is also the sam thought and sentiment of the 
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self in four different contexts in the four quotes hat echo one another. The Mariner’s 
identity remains constant despite the chaos that he experiences: it should be 
remembered that, Coleridge wrote this whilst primarly focussed on the empirical 
philosophies of Hartley and Berkeley. 
Fairer also regards Coleridge’s thought to have “distinctive Lockean elements” and 
asserts that “continuity of self is ‘produced’ by recollection” which has empirical 
implications (36). A primary element of the “Rime” is its recollective nature. The 
narrative of this ballad is framed by the Mariner accosting the wedding-guest to recall 
his tale. This element of recollection also contains strong empirical values that predate 
Coleridge’s focus on German Idealism. 
Coleridge affirms chaotic states in the poems of imagination, the “Rime” and 
“Christabel” being outstanding examples. There are,moreover, the unfathomable and 
mercurial characteristics that cause these chaotic states and complement them. Once 
Coleridge has established these states, the Mariner a d Christabel occupy a new 
position, which offers the opportunity for introspection and self-perception from a 
new perspective. Their positions occur in circumstances of isolation and lost volition. 
In these, the isolated self has limited agency due to circumstances that disable the 
ability to act, and that place the self in a new context. Thus, the will is limited. 
In these imagination poems, and in several other poms of Coleridge’s where these 
states of limited volition occur, they begin with trespass, signalled by the crossing of 
boundaries or lines. This line-crossing that leads to these states is a significant factor 
in several of Coleridge’s poems. 
With reference to crossing lines, Bloom elucidates that the “romance-of-trespass” 
or the violation of sacred ground is central to modern literature (Bloom, 1975, 35). 
This trait of crossing lines into forbidden ground or activity is a central element in 
Coleridge’s poems of heightened imagination. 
Trespass also occurs in other poems of his. “The Three Graves” Coleridge 
developed from Wordsworth’s version of this poem in 1798 (PW I i 336). In it 
Edward marries Mary. He is indiscreet and causes his future mother-in-law to fall in 
love with him. He and Mary incur the fury of her mother, who curses them and their 
marriage. This action is not understood by Mary. Edward reveals his indiscretion to 
Mary and Ellen at the end, and reveals about his mother-in-law, “O God, forgive me! 
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(he exclaimed)//“I have torn out her heart.” (Ibid.155, ll. 313-4). His flirtatiousness is 
the line crossed that provokes her curse, leading their situation into the realm of 
trespass. Christabel, interrupted while she prays for her knight, acts on compulsion to 
help Geraldine, which enables the evil of Geraldine to nter the castle. Christabel does 
not think out her decision to help Geraldine, and does not enquire within herself about 
it. She does not enquire from God about it, to whom she appeals for the safety of her 
knight. Instead, Christabel brings Geraldine home “in love and in charity” (Ibid. 491, 
ll. 277). Her oversight is similar to the error of Saul, king of Israel, who consulted the 
Witch of Endor instead of God (Thompson, 1990, 1 Samuel 28), which is one of the 
acts that led to his downfall. 
Many critics explain that Geraldine’s condition and presence beneath the “old oak 
tree” is the result of the abuse and malevolent intent of the “warriors” who 
temporarily left her there. In hindsight of Parts I and Part II of “Christabel”, it is 
revealed that Geraldine is a liar and a deceiver, among several other suggested evils. It 
follows that the abuse she received at the hands of the warriors might have been their 
attempt to be free of her, and bring to an end her activities in their domain, which 
Geraldine endeavoured to continue in Leoline’s castle. As the ballad continues 
Geraldine reveals characteristics, in Leoline’s castle, that if already present in the 
warriors’ domain, would certainly legitimise their actions to get rid of her. If this is 
the case, then they are honourable and their abandonment of her is justifiable. In this 
respect Christabel takes the situation for granted, that Geraldine is an innocent victim, 
and this carelessness is what causes Christabel’s trespass. 
The causation of trespass in “The Three Graves” is moral whereas in “Christabel” 
it is spiritual. In the “Rime” several forms of trespass occur. The first trespass 
concerns the poems association with alternative forms of art at the end of the 
eighteenth century. Common traits exist between Joseph Turner’s paintings and 
Coleridge’s “Rime”. James Heffernan elucidates that in part three of the “Rime”, 
beginning as a speck, the ship grows into a “certain shape” described as moving 
through the sky rather than the sea. Turner’s paintings of ships on the open sea and 
the Mariner’s ship both have the sky behind them (Heffernan, 1984, 56-7). Both have 
geometric qualities of which Heffernan states, “[w]here we look for the vertical we 
find a bowed and slanted mast, where we look for a level horizon, we find another 
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slant with a curve at the end”. This, he recognises, is “defiance towards the doctrines 
of parallel perspective” (68-9). The relationship between the “Rime” and Turner’s 
paintings lies in their simultaneous representations f similar concepts. However, 
there is no evidence of any influence on the one by the other; rather they indicate an 
equivalent but separate move from accepted and conventional representations. Both 
defy and fragment the accepted modes and functions of previous representations. 
Several instances of geometric reference emerge in the “Rime”. These include 
geographic markers and the implication of a wider and infinite world. Preceding the 
poem the “Argument” refers to “[h]ow a Ship having passed the Line was driven by 
Storms to the cold Country” (PW I i 370). Here “the Line” is the equator. Further 
geographic indicators are found immediately after the ship has left the harbour. The 
following is from the 1834 version of the “Rime”: 
 
The ship was cheered, the harbour cleared, 
Merrily did we drop 
Below the kirk, below the hill, 
Below the lighthouse top. 
 
The Sun came up upon the left, 
Out of the sea came he! 
And he shone bright, and on the right 
Went down into the sea. 
 
Higher and higher every day, 
Till over the mast at noon–– 
(PW I i 373-375, ll. 21-30) 
 
The geographic references in these stanzas indicate astronomical geometrics. The ship 
drops beyond sight of the kirk, hill and lighthouse, which implies the curvature of the 
earth. Sunrise and sunset refer to the earth’s rotation nd the opposite horizons. A 
juxtaposing angle occurs in the vertical mast at noon. These three orientations 
Coleridge links using the sun’s position from three different angles in relation to the 
ship. They are separated by 90 degrees, sunrise, midday and sunset. The position of 
the sun directly over the mast at noon once more refers to the equator, or equatorial 




And now the storm-blast came, and he 
Was tyrannous and strong: 
He struck with his o’ertaking wings, 
And chased us south along. 
 
With sloping masts and dripping prow, 
As who pursued with yell and blow 
Still treads the shadow of his foe, 
And forward bends his head, 
The ship drove fast, loud roared the blast, 
And southward aye we fled. 
(PW I i 375-377, ll. 41-50) 
 
When the “Line” of the equator is crossed, the ship induces the “storm-blast”. The 
Mariner is now at the storm’s mercy. Coleridge amended the 1834 text to read, “And 
chased us south along” (ll. 44), where the 1798 version reads, “Like Chaff we drove 
along” (376, ll. 44). The later version gains a directional bearing, but loses the 
Biblical reference to useless chaff blown away by the wind. The wind disturbs the 
horizon, sets the sky in turmoil and slopes the mast. The previous ordered and 
geometrically perfect image of the ship and the sea Coleridge turns into a portrayal 
similar to Turner’s deliberate “disarrayal” of artistic convention. 
Sea-travel was, for Coleridge, a thing he had never xperienced at the time that he 
wrote the “Rime” in 1797-8. His knowledge of the geo raphy and sailing details that 
he incorporated in the 1798 text he learned from people who had observed them, such 
as William Wales. As Richard Holmes points out Coleridge later incorporated 
elements from his own sea journeys into the 1817 edition of the “Rime”. This later 
edition included the light from the compass and the lamp of the steersman that 
Coleridge observed aboard the Speedwell (Holmes, 1999, 3). 
Secondary sources were of great value to Coleridge, as a contribution to the 
imagination poetry, when he wrote the first edition f the “Rime”. By contrast the 
compass and the lamp he incorporated into the 1817 edition from first-hand 
experience. The first edition of this imagination poem however had marine subjects 
almost entirely derived from secondary sources. Despit  this, they do not provide a 
format for Coleridge’s construction of this poem. This marine reference is in keeping 
with Coleridge’s universality. Coleridge uses these sources to inform his formidable 
imagination wherein he incorporates them in the context of the self represented in the 
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“Rime” regarding solitude, introspection and isolation. The purpose of the voyage is 
also unknown, despite guesses including slavery and discovery, but the ship’s arrival 
in the Antarctic carries no sense of discovery. Instead the Mariner finds solitude and 
inadvertent wonderment, which are factors relating o the self, and its reaction to the 
new environment. These characteristics of Romanticism are what Coleridge found 
important. 
After the ship crosses the equator and is blown to the latitudes of ice, a second line 
is trespassed when the Mariner kills the albatross. This brings about further 
wandering, but now in a lost state. In the “Rime” the line between cause and effect is 
explicit, without the subtlety found in “Christabel”. “The Raven”, like “The three 
Graves” is not a poem of the imagination, but is also unambiguous in its reference to 
cause and effect. The line-crossing in “The Raven” is marked by the felling of the 
oak, although the woodman who commits this trespass is probably not drowned in the 
wreck. Cain’s recollective emphasis on causation occurs in “The Wanderings of 
Cain”, in which Cain “denies” Abel’s murder, but his situation as a wandering exile is 
the fruit of his work. 
Adversity follows the wrongful actions or omissions in each poem, and reaches 
those who are not responsible for it. This sets a new trajectory for the protagonist in 
each case. It either limits the freedom of the individual or brings about his/her demise 
or that of others. The Raven, which caused no harm, nd the Mariner survive, but with 
loss for the Raven, and for the Mariner the necessity to recount his magical tale. In 
each case a line is crossed that is faint in most in tances but which divides the 
circumstances at the beginning from the resolution at the end. 
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Chapter 5 
Terrible rudderlessness: a footnote, or, prior notes towards a conclusion 
The Biographia forms a biography, a study of Kantean thinking and  account of 
imagination poetry, and contains a kind of conclusion to Coleridge’s imagination. It 
says goodbye to the imagination, which has been dissolved by the metaphysical.4 
Coleridge developed his thought on German Idealism after his return from 
Germany, and this significantly influenced the later growth of his own philosophical 
theories. This is denoted in a letter to Southey (29 July 1802, CL II 830), in which 
Coleridge explains his intention to establish a critical theory. Newlyn regards this as 
an early purpose for the Biographia (Newlyn, 1986, 87). Coleridge’s intention in the 
Biographia was to explicate his theories on politics, religion and philosophy, and 
apply the rules deduced from philosophical principles “to poetry and criticism” (BL I 
5). As part of this project, he longed to rediscover his imaginative ability, hence, 
among his other intended functions for the Biographia was his focus on metaphysics, 
imagination and fancy. 
Philosophically Coleridge conceived the Biographia against empiricism and 
materialism (Engell, 65). He had opposed philosophical materialism throughout his 
life, and in the Biographia he finally dispensed with Hartley. However, concering 
empiricism, he continued with Berkeley, and also manifested Lockean characteristics 
thereafter.  
The Biographia is Coleridge’s attempt to establish his rendering of metaphysics 
and the nature of poetry, and the poetry of imaginatio  in particular. The Biographia 
is widely criticised for its incoherence, disjointedness, and failure to accomplish what 
it sets out to. James Wood refers to this perceived failure of Coleridge as “[t]errible 
rudderlessness” (Wood, 45). However what Wood does n t acknowledge, and nor do 
                                                      
4 Coleridge added the glosses to the “Rime” at the same time as he wrote the Biographia. It represents 
a farewell to the imagination and is a dull aftershock to his loss of imaginative force. It is the last muted 
rumbles of imagination as it disappears, and is Coleridge’s conclusion to the life and structure of the
imagination poems. 
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many other critics of Coleridge, is that the Biographia is a new and persuasive form 
of criticism. Paul Hamilton asserts that despite its failings the Biographia established 
the need for a philosophical explanation of critical activity (Hamilton, 1983, 11). In it 
Coleridge also attempted to explicate imagination poetry, and demonstrate the 
relevance of philosophy to poetry. Hamilton clarifies that this was only possible 
through German aesthetic theories, most appropriately those of Kant and Schiller 
(Hamilton, 41). 
Its universality also established it as unique. Hamilton considers that sympathetic 
critics fill the gap in Coleridge’s argument with teir own theories (Hamilton, 14). 
Coleridge however did not try to mould the Biographia into a standard form of 
criticism by limiting its universal range or focus, or by reducing it to what he could 
explain, but he forfeited solutions to some of its arguments as a result. It also remains 
unresolved despite the two-hundred years of scrutiny that it has experienced. 
Despite Coleridge’s reduced poetic output after 1800, his other literary output 
escalated. Coleridge and William Hazlitt, Nichol Smith affirms, are regarded by 
modern critics as the most influential of the figures involved in establishing the new 
criticism,5 although Coleridge’s contribution is considered fragmentary in this area. 
What deepens this critical focus is Hazlitt and Coleridge’s propensity for discussing 
the nature of poetry in their lectures that extends their “philosophic depth in the new 
criticism” (Smith, 1906, xxvi). 
The inability of critics to resolve the Biographia is the result of Coleridge insisting 
on adhering to his initial intention in this text but failing, instead of adapting it. As a 
result, it possesses a universal nature. Engell quotes Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s remark 
that the Biographia could have the heading “Arts and Humanities,” and 
“Interdisciplinary” owing to its unconventional nature and its range of disciplines, 
with the exception of “national or social history” (Engell, 65). 
The newness of Coleridge’s universal ambition in the Biographia, to provide an 
explanation of his critical activity and the imagination poems, naturally required 
ironing out. As a pioneering text of the new criticism, its experimental newness would 
render it unsatisfactory. The modern critics of the Biographia have almost two 
                                                      
5 The “new criticism”, as the ambition of Coleridge and Hazlitt, is not to be mistaken for the “New 
Criticism” of the twentieth-century. 
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centuries of hindsight on which to judge this text. Ironically, many of the modern 
critical and analytical standpoints, from which it is judged, are derived from its 
context in this new criticism, and thus have the Biographia as a partial ancestor. 
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Conclusion 
Once a volume of gold leaf: Conclusion 
At this stage we can concur with Coleridge in his 180  apprehension that poetry had 
died in him. As we began this thesis, so let us be reminded of that self-judgement: “I 
was once a Volume of Gold Leaf, arising and ringing o  every breath of Fancy––but I 
have beaten myself back into weight and density, and now I sink in quicksilver, yea, 
remain squat and square on the earth” (25 March 1801, CL II 714). 
Metaphysics confounded Coleridge’s imagination when  encountered Kantian 
philosophy and German Idealism. With this subjective focus Coleridge became 
disengaged from objectively focussed empirical philosophy. Specifically his 
speculations in metaphysics diverted him from the empirical philosophy that 
underpinned his imaginative force, and are thus primarily responsible for the 
diminution of that power in him, and for the cessation of the imagination poems. 
It was in particular Coleridge’s empirical gauge with the late 1790s that fed into 
his treasure house of imagination. Coleridge left this behind by devoting his attention 
to the philosophy relating to reason, which does not speak to poetry. He turned to 
philosophy for an account of the unworldly, and theless occasion poetry found in 
him. Of the factors that caused Coleridge to lose hi  poetic force, this is the most 
significant. 
Richard Holmes opens the second half of his illuminating and deeply perceptive 
biography, Coleridge: Darker Reflections, with Coleridge bound for Malta aboard the 
Speedwell in 1804 (Holmes, 1999, 1-10). It may well be that Coleridge was much 
more robust in mind on Malta than at first it seems, Nicholas Roe affirms.6 On Malta 
he was the secretary to the governor of a site of primary importance, politically and 
militarily, to the British government during the greatest war it had yet faced. The 
                                                      
6 This reference to Coleridge’s purpose on Malta I obtained from a conversation with Nicholas Roe at 
the 12th Coleridge Summer Conference, The Friends of Coleridg , Cannington, England (21-28 July 
2010). 
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responsibility required to meet this position permits Coleridge no recovery from his 
opium habit. 
It is on this voyage that we encounter Coleridge commenting in his notebooks 
about the mercurial nature of the surrounding fleet, the characteristics of his fellow 
passengers, and most significantly the exercise of his understanding whilst attempting 
to awaken “the feelings of the heart” (BL I 17). His faculties, in their entirety, he 
constantly nurtured, even if the choice of content was incompatible. He continued to 
find impressions, perceptions and reference to the self and his surroundings. The 
Speedwell he describes in characteristic fashion, exploring the geometric effect of its 
shape.  
 
2. The proportion of the solid height to the Height above the Hull, 
about as 40 to 160, made graceful & right by the strongly felt 
Lightness & Airiness of the Sails /… 
5. The harmony of the Lines––the ellipses & semicircles of the 
bellying Sails & of the Hull, with the variety from the permanence of 
the one & the contingency of the other/ 
6. The terminating Lines of the Sails forming a similar curve with the 
sail… 
7….nothing more administers to the Picturesque thanis phantom of 
complete visual wholeness in an object, which visually does not form 
a whole, by the influence ab intra of the sense of its perfect 
Intellectual Beauty or Wholeness… 
(CN, ii, 2012) 
 
His need to define the mercurial “permanence of the on  & the contingency of the 
other/” and the “ellipses & semicircles” of the sail  recalls the shifting geometry in the 
“Rime”. It also recalls the shift and temporality of impressions in the imagination 
poems. His natural faculties he continued to expand, and his original, inherent 
tendencies remained true, and so too did his “fancy, and the love of nature, and the 
sense of beauty in forms and sounds” (BL I 117). His collective experience of his past 
existence he continued to assert, despite his loss of imaginative force. His aspirations 
to poetry, and there were many as his letters and notebooks tell, in many cases 
remained unfinished, and in some cases were not started. His epic poem, “The Siege 
of Jerusalem” he never began, along with many other texts. 
Coleridge’s thought and intention had not altered, and in some respects the 
imaginative force that threw up the imagination poems was a moment in his continual 
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development, which was regrettably lost in his broader intention for universal 
knowledge. Consequently the directions that his poetry, philosophy and learning took 










*  As with all Coleridgean scholars I am much indebted to the Bollingen Series for 
their publications of Coleridge’s works. 
 
*  In the text, I am following the reference conventio of the Coleridge Bulletin. For
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